Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Helms.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Preyer. This may be a good place for us to break, if you have completed your questioning, Mr. Chairman.
Let me suggest that the committee recess until 1:30. Would that be agreeable to you, Mr. Helms?

Mr. Helms. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Preyer. Is that agreeable with the committee?
The committee stands recessed until 1:30 today.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the hearing was recessed, the committee to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. of the same day.]

**AFTERNOON SESSION**

Mr. Preyer. The committee will resume its session.
The Chair recognizes Congressman Dodd for such time as he may consume to resume the questioning.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, before I begin my line of questioning, I would like to ask you if you might not want to clarify one of your statements. I received some calls over the lunch break from some constituents from my home State of Connecticut who were listening to the testimony this morning. They mentioned to me your response earlier regarding Eastern Europeans and Asians with their propensity to be able to pass polygraph tests, and it occurred to me that you might want to rephrase your statement.
I understood you to mean trained agents from those parts of the world rather than Asians and Eastern Europeans as ethnic groups. I thought you might want to take a minute to clarify that.

**TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS—(Resumed)**

Mr. Helms. Mr. Dodd, if my generalization caused offense, I had no intention of doing this. What I, in effect, was trying to say was that there is an occasional individual who lives in that part of the world who has spent his life lying about one thing or another and therefore becomes so good at it that he can pass the polygraph test. But this would be 1 individual in maybe 1 million or a 100,000, something of that kind.
I imagine Americans, if they set their minds to it, could do it as well. I meant no offense to Eastern Europeans as a category or any individual Eastern European.

Mr. Dodd. I thought I would clear that up.

Mr. Helms. I am glad you did. I am sorry if any of your constituents felt I was being disrespectful, but I had no intention of being that way.

Mr. Dodd. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask the clerk to show to the witness JFK exhibit F-413A. This is a letter dated April 3, 1964, from Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel, that Mr. Helms brought with him this morning and had, I believe, inserted in the record.
This is the only copy. Would you please show that to Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms. I have it in front of me, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Helms, I noted in looking at the exhibit during the lunch break that there was no signature on that letter. There
is an initial. I am not sure it is even Mr. Houston's initial but it was not signed by anyone. I would like to, if I could, address some questions to you with regard to Mr. Houston and the credibility of that statement.

This morning you supplied the committee with this memorandum which was ostensibly written by Mr. Houston, the former CIA General Counsel, regarding meetings with the Justice Department officials about Nosenko. That was the substance anyway, as I understood it, of the memorandum. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DODD. Is this the same Lawrence Houston who on May 7, 1962, along with Sheffield Edwards, also of the CIA, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy about the pre-Bay of Pigs CIA Mafia plots?

Mr. HELMS. I believe it was the same Mr. Houston. He was General Counsel of the Agency for many years.

Mr. DODD. I am looking here at the report from the Intelligence Committee on page 131, the bottom paragraph: "Briefing of the Attorney General on May 7, 1962."

An entry in Attorney General Kennedy's calendar for May 7, 1962, states, "1 o'clock Richard Helms. At 4 o'clock the Attorney General met with Houston and Edwards to be briefed on the CIA operation involving Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana."

Mr. HELMS. That would be the meeting.

Mr. DODD. That satisfies your recollection?

Mr. HELMS. That satisfies my recollection. I have been questioned about that calendar on many occasions. That appointment that I had with the Attorney General that day at 1 o'clock apparently was canceled, so I was never there. But I believe Edwards and Houston did keep their appointment.

Mr. DODD. Isn't it true that at that meeting both Mr. Houston and Mr. Edwards told the Attorney General—on May 17, 1962—that the CIA-Mafia plots no longer were in any existence, were terminated?

Mr. HELMS. That is my understanding of what they told him, Mr. Dodd. I believe—wasn't that contained in a memorandum for the record written after their meeting? Was it written by Colonel Edwards? I don't recall; someone wrote it.

Mr. DODD. I will quote for you the bottom paragraph, bb, on page 132 of this report. It says, "And that Kennedy was told the activity had been terminated as of that time."

Mr. HELMS. I assume that is what they told him.

Mr. DODD. In fact, I will read a direct quote here I have on page 133 of this same report, footnote 4 referring to the italicized paragraph at the top of page 133:

The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had already been reactivated, nor as far as we know was he ever told that CIA had a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements.

That is from the Inspector General's report, page 65. That is where the italicized words come from. And then the fourth footnote referring to this general line of questioning, it says, footnote 4:

Houston testified that Kennedy insisted "There was not to be any contact of the Mafia without prior consultation with him."
Isn't it also true to your knowledge that in 1967 the CIA Inspector General's report concluded that Sheffield Edwards had, in fact, lied when they and Houston had told the Attorney General that these plots no longer existed?

Mr. HELMS. Does it appear in the Inspector General's report that Edwards lied?

Mr. DODD. Well, maybe semantically we could——

Mr. HELMS. I'm not caviling, I just don't recall any more.

Mr. DODD. On page 134 of this same report, I am reading from the first full paragraph at the top of page 134, which reads as follows:

As concluded by the CIA itself and the Inspector General's report, Edwards' statement that he was not aware of these developments is implausible.

Do you have any disagreement with that statement?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know how to judge it one way or the other. I did not recall the statement as I was sitting here, and I am just unable to help with it. If the Inspector General thought it was implausible, I guess he thought it was, but I don't think any final judgment was made about it. It was part of a very long report which was directed at some other things as well, and I don't recall this ever became an issue that anybody had attempted to define, or refine, let me put it that way.

Mr. DODD. The reason I raise it is the credibility of Mr. Houston with regard to the memo, and I thought maybe you might be able to shed some light on why that was not signed. Was that a normal operating procedure not to sign something with your name type-written underneath it?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. What we are dealing with is a Xerox, or if it isn't a Xerox—maybe I shouldn't use a company name—let's say a copy. I don't know whether it is a copy of the original memorandum Mr. Houston wrote or a copy of a copy that was made at the time that he wrote the memorandum. I don't know who put the signed LRH down here. In other words, I think that we need some help from the agency as to the exact circumstances, but I can't conceive that Mr. Houston wouldn't be glad to speak for himself. He is still alive and well and living here in Washington.

Mr. DODD. Thank you very much.

This morning I believe I heard you testify that you gave all of the information you believed pertinent to the Warren Commission's investigation—to the commission promptly. Am I recalling your statement correctly there?

Mr. HELMS. I said—I believe I testified, Mr. Dodd, that I believed this to be the case although I had learned in recent years that one must never make a flat statement about anything, so there may have been certain cases in which they did not get information promptly. But I believe our effort was to give it to them as promptly as possible.

Mr. DODD. Alright, I would like to proceed, if I could, for the next few minutes and ask you to respond to questions surrounding the so-called assassination plots that were ongoing during the period from 1961 on. And so I would like to have you focus your attention on that particular aspect of your inquiry here today.
My first question is, to your knowledge, was any member of the Warren Commission, or its staff, ever informed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. HELMS. I assume that you are referring to the one that is most frequently characterized as an assassination plot which involved the Mafia? Because the other assassination plots I don't accept as assassination plots. And so again we have a definitional problem.

Mr. DODD. Let's start off and ask whether the Warren Commission was ever informed of any of these attempts on the Cuban regime whether on the person of Fidel Castro or an effort to overthrow his government, or an effort to knock him off personally—whatever they fall into. In any of those to areas your knowledge was the Warren Commission, members or their staff, ever informed of these efforts?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know what the Warren Commission knew, Mr. Dodd. I didn't inform them of these things, but they had among them as members Mr. Allen Dulles, who was certainly aware of what had been going on with respect to Cuba; Senator Russell of Georgia, the chairman of the Oversight Committee, who was also aware of what was going on with respect to Cuba; Mr. McConne, who was director at the time, also knew what was happening. What the Commission knew from those gentlemen I don't know. I never spoke to them myself about it.

Mr. DODD. But you never did personally?

Mr. HELMS. I never did.

Mr. DODD. I would like to draw your attention if I could to page 22 of your now declassified August 9, 1978, testimony before this committee written, you stated and I will quote—do you have a copy of the report in front of you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I do. What page is this?

Mr. DODD. Page 22.

Mr. HELMS. I am on 22.

Mr. DODD. On line 9. Doe, your copy read, "The only assassination plot that had any semblance of substance to it"—I am quoting your response now to Mr. Goldsmith's question—"was one involving a couple of Mafia chieftains and which were supposed to have taken place before the Bay of Pigs."

Is that an accurate reflection of your views?

Mr. HELMS. As far as I know, it is an accurate statement. I would make essentially the same statement today.

Mr. DODD. Before proceeding with the line of questioning on that, may I ask who these Mafia organized crime chieftains were?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection—I would like to point out that there were two times in which different people were in touch with the Mafia. One happened before I was aware that this was going on and which was the episode that was referred to by Colonel Edwards and Mr. Houston when they saw the Attorney General.

The second one, which I never characterized as an assassination plot because as far as I knew it never went anywhere, was a second one involving the Mafia, the one which I have on public television apologized for and said it was the greatest mistake of my life to have had anything to do with it and I am sorry about it. But I have
never had any convincing evidence from any human being today that this plot ever went anywhere.

I think just to make myself quite explicit here, I would want to see the information that said that I had any indication from William Harvey that his operation with Rosselli ever produced anything in Havana. I would like some evidence of this. I would like a statement under oath from somebody other than a Mafia chieftain.

Mr. Dodd. I will go back to my question again. The first relationship existed prior to your direct involvement, is that right?

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Dodd. This is prior to the May 7, 1962, meeting referred to by Colonel Edwards and Mr. Houston?

Mr. Helms. That is right, and therefore I don't know the details of it.

Mr. Dodd. Am I correct in assuming that the names referred to in the report Mr. Rosselli, Mr. Giancana, that those were the principals involved. Were there others that you were aware of?

Mr. Helms. I believe there were others. I thought there was a fellow named Trafficante involved but I am not sure about that. He maybe came into the picture later.

Mr. Dodd. I do recognize that you have made a public apology and I preface my questions to you with that in mind. But could you tell this committee who the individuals were that you happened to be involved with on the second set of circumstances involving Mafia chieftains or organized crime figures?

Mr. Helms. As far as I am aware in that particular situation it was William K. Harvey who was in touch with John Rosselli, and it was Harvey and Rosselli who were attempting to find, if I understood it correctly, some channel from Florida into Havana.

I also understand that there was a question of poison pills which were supposed to be transported to Havana. There was never any evidence they were ever transported there or ever left the United States. There was never any evidence that this plot ever left the Florida mainland. If it was indeed an assassination plot, it was misadvertised to me, because I had understood it was an effort to see if a connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida and the Mafia in Havana. To the best of my knowledge, the connection never was made.

Mr. Dodd. Other than Mr. Harvey and Mr. Rosselli, was there anyone else that would fall into the character of being members of organized crime that you had direct contact with?

Mr. Helms. I had direct contact with none of—the only gentleman I had direct contact with myself was Harvey, who was a staff officer. I never met Mr. Rosselli. I never met Mr. Giancana. If I met a Mafia chieftain, I wasn't aware of it.

Mr. Dodd. Am I to understand that Mr. Giancana was also involved in this second—

Mr. Helms. I don't think he was. It was not my understanding that he was. But then I have no way of demonstrating that, Mr. Dodd. The Mafia has its own internal organization, and who Rosselli talked to I don't know.

Mr. Dodd. Going back again to the statement that I read from page 22 of your declassified testimony before this committee, "The only assassination plot that had any semblance or substance was
the one involving a couple of Mafia chieftains.” I would like to, refer to JFK exhibit F-527. I would ask the clerk to supply Mr. Helms with a copy of that exhibit.

And I would ask you, Mr. Helms, if you would take a look over this exhibit with particular emphasis on the last paragraph of what is page 2 of the exhibit, page 3, to the top of page 4, ending with the paragraph that ends at the top of page 4. Take a minute to look at that.

I am not asking that you read it out loud but just that you familiarize yourself with the contents of this exhibit.

Mr. HELMS. I have read that now.

Mr. DODD. Is it fair to assume you recognize this document? You have seen it before?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I have.

Mr. DODD. Am I correct in stating this is the CIA’s Inspector General’s report done in 1967—

Mr. HELMS. The one that I asked to have done.

Mr. DODD. The one you asked to have done as DCI, Director of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Right.

Mr. DODD. I don’t intend to read all of this but beginning at the last sentence on page 2 of the Inspector General’s report it reads as follows:

We can identify five separate phases in agency assassination planning although the transitions from one to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing government attitude toward the Cuban regime.

Without reading each one of them, the Inspector General’s report prepared at your request, then outlines in separate paragraphs, from A to E, five separate phases, as they describe, and using their language again, in “agency assassination planning.”

I would like to know, first of all, how you can explain that we have in a report prepared for you in 1967 what appears to me to be five separate areas of assassination planning and how that can be distinguished from your statement to this committee in executive session where you talk about basically one or the semblance of one assassination attempt involving organized crime figures. Can you please enlighten the committee as to how you can reach two separate——

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I can. I think this is rather lurid language that has been used in this report. As I read through it, this looks like the efforts that were made during this time to upset the Castro regime. If one identifies that as assassination planning, I don’t think that is a proper description of it, and if somebody will come forth with all the items that are supposed to have been in that planning, I would be delighted to hear it.

Mr. DODD. They identify here one period beginning prior to August 1960. That is the first one. The second one is August 1960 to April 1961. The third is April 1961 late 1961.

Mr. HELMS. Aren’t those all the same one?

Mr. DODD. That is my question for you. The Inspector General seemed to distinguish between the various phases here, and according to your testimony before us, is this what you were referring to? Is this what you are calling one, what they call five?
Mr. Helms. That is right. I became involved with this business sometime in 1962 after I took over as DDP. I've forgotten what month. Anything prior to that I didn't have anything to do with. I would assume this was one plot but maybe there were others. But if there are, in all the time I spent with the Church committee and all the time I have spent endlessly for the last 3 or 4 years, it seems to me, about these matters, I haven't had anything else brought to my attention. And if you gentlemen have something, I would like to know it. But I don't know what it is and I am sorry I can't help.

Mr. Dodd. Did you take issue with this report 11 years ago at the time it was issued?

Mr. Helms. Mr. Dodd, when I got this report I had some problems with respect to reporting to President Johnson about certain points that he was particularly interested in. I did not attempt to parse it or analyze it or get it changed or do anything with it except use it as a fact-finding document.

I want to say right now that I never expected to see the document in the public domain declassified for the appetites of all those who wanted to make the most of it, and therefore if I had known this, I obviously would have edited the report and changed it rather substantially, put it in the hands of lawyers and had it entirely rearranged.

Mr. Dodd. I say to you, Mr. Helms, with all due respect, it is not being put into evidence to satisfy the voracious appetites of anyone but merely to try to clear up a point we are trying to resolve here. I hope you don't understand—

Mr. Helms. What is the point you would like to resolve?

Mr. Dodd. As someone who is just confronted, I am not an expert in these matters but I read your transcript and you said, "The only assassination plot that had any semblance of substance was the one involving a couple of Mafia chieftians."

Mr. Helms. And that is what I believe to this date.

Mr. Dodd. I am confronted with an Inspector General's report which was not written to satisfy the appetites of anyone I presume. It is a declassified document which says, "We can identify five separate phases." I am merely asking you to clarify that in light of the earlier statement. That is the only purpose for this being brought into testimony.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. For example, it says here that particular scheme—which scheme? Is this the Mafia thing that we are talking about?

Mr. Dodd. That is correct.

Mr. Helms. And was again pushed vigorously in the area of Mongoose and in the climate of intense administration pressure to do something about Castro and Cuba. Are we talking about the same Mafia thing here as well? If that is a lot of plots, I regard it as one and the same operation. And if I am misleading you in some fashion—

Mr. Dodd. Maybe I can help you. Is it one and the same in your mind because it involved Cuba and Fidel Castro, and that was one entity?

Mr. Helms. The only one that I know about that was serious or that seemed to have been taken seriously was the one involving
Rosselli and Harvey. I believe the Church committee brought out—found a wetsuit, a clam shell, various things that were on the shelf in the agency that were regarded as things that might be used in possibly killing Castro, or being used against him, which never came off the shelf, were never used. If that is a plot to have created this, then I will back up and say we ought to enumerate every single item that conceivably had to do with the invasions of Cuba which we were constantly running under government aegis. We had task forces that were striking at Cuba constantly. We were attempting to blow up powerplants, we were attempting to ruin sugar mills, we were attempting to do all kinds of things during this period. This was a matter of American Government policy. This wasn’t the CIA alone.

Now, if those things taper over into assassination plots, maybe so. I find the semantics the English incendiary but not very clear and not very clarifying, and not very specific.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that exhibit JFK F-527 be entered into the record at this time.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, JFK F-527 is entered into the record at this point.

[Whereupon exhibit JFK F-527 was received in evidence.]
Mr. G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Blakey:

Attached, you will find pages 1-8, 14, 17-18, 24-25, 37-39, 62a-63, 94, 118, 130-133 from the report by the Inspector General on plotting against Castro. These pages have been sanitized and declassified in compliance with a request by Mr. Goldsmith, and may be used by you in your hearings.

It should be noted that it is Agency policy to not release reports of the Inspector General outside the Agency, in order to protect the unique fact-finding advisory function that they fulfill within the Agency. Were the internal confidentiality of the reports to be compromised the effectiveness of the function could be impaired. Because so much of the information from the 1967 report was placed officially in the public domain by the interim report of the Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, it can be released in this form on this special occasion.

Sincerely yours,

S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA

encl.
This reconstruction of Agency involvement in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main events or were put on paper from memory years afterward. William Harvey has retained skeletal notes of his activities during the years in question, and they are our best source of dates. of the Office of Medical Services, has a record of whom he met and when and cryptic references to the subjects discussed. of TSD, has a record of two or three dates that are pertinent. and were involved in only the technical aspects of operational planning, and their participations were short-lived. Although fragmentary, their records are a help in establishing critical time frames. Operational files are useful in some instances, because they give dates of meetings, the substances of which may be inferred from collateral information.

For the most part, though, we have had to rely on information given to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time. Their recollections of dates are particularly hazy, and some of them
are no longer able to keep the details of one plan separate from those of another. We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Mr. Dulles and General Cabell. A complete list is attached at Tab L. We did not go on fishing expeditions among the mere possibles. To have done so would have risked making witting a number of employees who were previously unwitting and, in our estimate, would have added little to the details available from those directly involved. There are inconsistencies among the various accounts, but most of them can be resolved by collating the information furnished by all of the identifiable participants in a particular plan and by then checking it against specific dates that can be fixed with fair certainty. We believe that this reconstruction of what happened and of the thinking associated with it is reasonably sound. If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events. People still remember much of what happened, but they can no longer recall precisely when.

It became clear very early in our investigation that the vigor with which schemes were pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro personally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government's efforts to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases in Agency assassination planning, although the transitions from one
to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime.

a. Prior to August 1960: All of the identifiable schemes prior to about August 1960, with one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behaviour or by altering his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961: The plots that were hatched in late 1960 and early 1961 were aggressively pursued and were viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely one aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime that culminated in the Bay of Pigs.

c. April 1961 to late 1961: A major scheme that was begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and remained dormant for several months, as did most other Agency operational activity related to Cuba.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962: That particular scheme was reactivated in early 1962 and was again pushed vigorously in the era of Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense administration pressure on CIA to do something about Castro and his Cuba.

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the
aggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived in April 1962 was finally terminated in early 1963. Two other plots were originated in 1963, but both were impracticable and nothing ever came of them.

We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency officers felt themselves subject to the administration's severe pressures to do something about Castro and his regime. The fruitless and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in that light.

Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe, though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of the dominant figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body, will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government. This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about the downfall of a government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders from
positions of power, and there is always the risk that the participants will resort to assassination. Such removals from power as the house arrest of Mossadegh or the flight of Batista should not cause one to overlook the killings of Diem or of Trujillo by forces encouraged but not controlled by the U.S. Government.

There is a third point, which was not directly made by any of those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly from the interviews and from review of files. The point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche—the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro," which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime.

Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.

The suggestion was made to us that operations aimed at the assassination of Castro may have been generated in an atmosphere of stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro's
demise and on the reordering of the political structure that would follow. We reviewed intelligence publications from 1960 through 1966.

The NIE's on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba" have brief paragraphs on likely successor governments if Castro were to depart the scene.

In each case the treatment is no more nor less than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups such as these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the operators were unduly influenced by the content of intelligence publications.

Drew Pearson's column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson also has information, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a meeting at the State Department at which assassination of Castro was discussed and that a team actually landed in Cuba with pills to be used in an assassination attempt. There is basis in fact for each of those three reports.

a. A CIA officer passed an assassination weapon to an Agency Cuban asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 November 1963. The weapon was a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe.
The CIA officer suggested that the Cuban asset load the syringe with Black Leaf 40. The evidence indicates that the meeting was under way at the very moment President Kennedy was shot.

b. There was a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's conference room on 10 August 1962 at which Secretary McNamara broached the subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a Project MONGOOSE action memorandum prepared by Edward Lansdale. At another Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there was discussion of a recently-disseminated Clandestine Services information report on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CIA had refused the exile's request for funds and had no involvement in the plot.

c. CIA twice (first in early 1961 and again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working in behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1961 plot aborted and the pills were recovered. Those furnished in April 1962 were passed by the gambling syndicate representative to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who in turn had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team would make an attempt on Castro's life—perhaps using the pills.
This report describes these and other episodes in detail; puts them into perspective; and reveals, that while the events described by Drew Pearson did occur and are subject to being patched together as though one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unfounded.
The first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception in August 1960. It involved the use of members of the criminal underworld with contacts inside Cuba. The operation had two phases: the first ran from August 1960 until late April or early May 1961, when it was called off following the Bay of Pigs; the second ran from April 1962 until February 1963 and was merely a revival of the first phase which had been inactive since about May 1961.

Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, if Edwards could establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. The objective clearly was the assassination of Castro although Edwards claims that there was a studied avoidance of the term in his conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of WH Division, although King now recalls having had only limited knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date—about mid-1962.
same way. A memorandum for the record prepared by Sheffield Edwards on 14 May 1962 states: "No monies were ever paid to Roselli and Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods that he was in Miami." (Giancana is "Gold.")

... was introduced (in true name) to Roselli as an employee of Maheu, the explanation being that... would handle the case for Maheu, because Maheu was too busy to work on it full time himself. No one else in the Office of Security was made witting of the operation at this time. Edwards himself did not meet Roselli until the summer of 1962.

At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Edwards told Bissell that he had a friend, a private investigator, who had a contact who in turn had other contacts through whom syndicate elements in Cuba could be reached. These syndicate elements in Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter part of September 1960, Edwards, and Bissell were the only ones in the Agency who knew of a plan against Castro involving U.S. gangster elements. Edwards states that Richard Helms was not informed of the plan, because Cuba was being handled by Bissell at that time.

With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Allen Dulles) and the DCI (General Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; Edwards
deliberately avoided the use of any "bad words." The descriptive term used was "an intelligence operation." Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing. He recalls describing the channel as being "from A to B to C." As he then envisioned it, "A" was Maheu, "B" was Roselli, and "C" was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly, there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval to use his own judgment. Bissell committed $150,000 for the support of the operation.

(Comment: In the light of this description of the briefing, it is appropriate to conjecture as to just what the Director did approve. It is safe to conclude, given the men participating and the general subject of the meeting, that there was little likelihood of misunderstanding—even though the details were deliberately blurred and the specific intended result was never stated in unmistakable language. It is also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of "bad words" emphasized to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.)

During the week of 25 September 1960, and Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Cold" at a meeting.
tying it to a recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee, or bouillon, for which a liquid poison would be particularly well suited.

January - February 1961

Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets. remembers meeting with Edwards and in Edwards’ office to discuss the requirement. The specifications were that the poison be stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not immediately acting, and with a firmly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either liquid or solid form. states that the pill form was chosen because of ease and safety of handling.

(Comment: The gangsters may have had some influence on the choice of a means of assassination. says that in his very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely, Maheu’s discussions with them) consideration was given to possible ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency had first thought in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to this
use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job, because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante ("Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as who was then. The gangsters said that had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income, and needed the money.)

When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even disintegrate, let alone dissolve. took them back and made up a new batch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. He called on to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. has a record of a conversation with on 6 February 1961. It may have related to the tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective.
William Harvey, Chief of was briefed in February 1961 (by authority of Richard Bissell) on phase one of the gambling syndicate operation. That briefing was in connection with a sensitive operation that Bissell had assigned to Harvey. Harvey describes it thus: Early in the Kennedy administration, Bissell called him in to discuss what Harvey refers to as an Executive Action Capability; i.e., a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required. Harvey's notes quote Bissell as saying, "The White House has twice urged me to create such a capability." Bissell recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. He mentioned the Edwards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro in that context, but he now thinks that the operation was over by then and that reference to it was in terms of a past operation as a case in point. It was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be briefed by Edwards. Harvey's fixing of the date as February was only after review of events both preceding the briefing and following it. He says now that it might have been as early as late January or as late as March 1961.

After some discussion of the problems involved in developing an Executive Action Capability, Bissell placed Harvey in charge of the effort. Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects
of the problem with and with Since was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability, although never with respect to Castro. We did not question on his knowledge of the program for creating an Executive Action Capability, but Harvey's mention of him in this connection may explain a notation by that Harvey instructed to discuss techniques with without associating the discussion with the Castro operation.

Harvey states that after the decision was made to go ahead with the creating of an Executive Action Capability, and while he was still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helms fully on the general concept but without mention of the then ongoing plan to assassinate Castro.

The Executive Action program came to be known as ZRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QWIN, who had been recruited earlier for use in a special operation in the Congo assassination of Patrice Lumumba to be run by made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in an assassination attempt, and asked to be released—which Bissell granted. The project name, ZRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1951, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962. The new DD/P (Helms) on that date authorized Harvey, by
memorandum, to handle the project on a special basis. Accounting for
expenditures was to be by general category and on Harvey's certificate. The initial approval was for $11,700, consisting of $7,200
for QUIN's annual salary and $7,500 for operational expenses.

Project ZRRIFIE was covered as an operation (ostensibly
to develop a capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers).
It continued on a course separate from the Edwards/gambling syndicate
operation against Castro until 15 November 1961. Harvey has a note
that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of the
ZRRIFIE program to Cuba. Harvey says that Bissell instructed him to
take over Edwards' contact with the criminal syndicate and thereafter
to run the operation against Castro. Harvey adds that, as a completely
unrelated development, shortly after this discussion with Bissell he
was told by Helms that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's
Cuba task force.

Late 1961 - Early 1962

Harvey recalls that he was very busy with a number of things in
the period that followed the discussion with Bissell that led to his
taking over Edwards' Castro operation. He was turning over his
responsibilities in . He was working with NSA on the Martin/
Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and
briefed the DDCI, General Carter, who said he understood the situation and in due time might brief the Director, Mr. McCon. It is not known whether General Carter did or did not brief Mr. McCon. There is no indication that General Carter was further briefed on the full details of the assassination plot against Castro.

May 1962

The Attorney General obviously was told of CIA's operational involvement with gangster elements, because he requested a briefing on the details. On 7 May 1962 Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and, as Edwards puts it, "briefed him all the way." Houston says that after the briefing Kennedy "thought about the problem quite seriously." The Attorney General said that he could see the problem and that he could not proceed against those involved in the wiretapping case. He spoke quite firmly, saying in effect, "I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime again--with gangsters--you will let the Attorney General know before you do it." Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request. Edwards says that among the points covered was that of Roselli's motivation. The Attorney General had thought that Roselli was doing the job (the attempt at assassination of Castro) for money. Edwards corrected that impression; he was not.
Houston recalls that during the meeting with the Attorney General the latter asked for a memorandum record of the meeting. Edwards believes that the request was made later and by telephone. A memorandum was prepared and was signed by Edwards. Both Edwards and Houston recall having had a hand in writing it. A transmittal buckslip from Houston to Kennedy notes that the request was made on 11 May, which suggests that Edwards is correct in his belief that the request was made by telephone after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney General. The memorandum is dated 14 May 1962. It was typed in two copies only, with the original being sent to Attorney General Kennedy and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It was typed by Edwards' secretary. It does not state the purpose of the operation on which Kennedy was briefed, but it does make it clear that the operation was against Castro and its true purpose may be inferred from the memorandum.

Edwards states that the briefing of the Attorney General and the forwarding of a memorandum of record was carried out without briefing the Director (John McCone), the DDCI (General Carter), or the DD/P (Richard Helms). He felt that, since they had not been privy to the operation when it was underway, they should be protected from involvement in it after the fact. As noted previously, Houston had briefed the DDCI on the fact that there was a matter involving the
out of the meeting, and were informed that President Kennedy had been assassinated. was visibly moved over the news. He asked, "Why do such things happen to good people?" The contact report does not state the time nor the duration of the

--- AMASH --- meeting, but it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro. states that he received an OPIN cable from FitzGerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off. We do not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. There is a record in the file that was due to arrive back in Washington at 1810 hours, 23 November.

The AMLASH project was probably about as widely known within the Clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature. However, we can identify only four people who know of the just-described episode involving a hypodermic syringe and Black Leaf 40.

knew all of the story, knew most of it, and knew much of it. FitzGerald did not mention this aspect of the AMASH operation when he first briefed us on it. When we went back to him later with specific questions, he said he remembered something about Black Leaf 40, but nothing whatever about a device for administering it. said he had the impression that FitzGerald
THE DREW PEARSON STORY

Published Details

The CIA hatched a plot to knock off Castro.

Robert Kennedy may have approved an assassination plot.

Underworld figures were actually recruited to carry out the plot.

Three hired assassins were caught in Havana where a lone survivor is still supposed to be languishing in prison.

Castro learned enough at least to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. He is reported to have cooked up a counterplot against President Kennedy.

Unpublished Details

Pills were sent to Cuba for use in the assassination.

There was a meeting at the Department of State at which the assassination of Castro was discussed.

The Facts As We Know Them

True.

Not true. He was briefed on Gambling Syndicate-Phase One after it was over. He was not briefed on Phase Two.

True.

Roselli informed Harvey on 21 June 1962, presumably on the basis of information from ___ that a team of three men was inside Cuba. We do not know their identities nor what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually dispatched. None of the announced captures and executions during this period fits this team.

This reportedly has come out in the Garrison investigations. It also was stated by ___ in the Philippines under direct interrogation. We have no independent confirmation of any sort. (Note that Garrison met with Roselli in Las Vegas in March 1967.)

True. At least we were told by Roselli that the pills were sent in during Phase One and again in Phase Two.

True. The subject was raised at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination. It did result in a Mongoose action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning liquidation of leaders. The offending phrase was later excised from copies forwarded to CIA, State, Defense, and USIA, but the damage may already have been done.
him on the Pearson story.

d. Pearson, Anderson, and Greenspun (in Las Vegas) are newspapermen with a newsworthy story. Pearson has already published much of it.

e. Maheu does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative client, Howard Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion.

What do other components of Government know about this operation?

Former Attorney General Robert Kennedy was fully briefed by Houston and Edwards on 7 May 1962. A memorandum confirming the oral briefing was forwarded to Kennedy on 14 May 1962. The memorandum does not use the word "assassinate," but there is little room for misinterpretation of what was meant. Presumably the original of that memorandum is still in the files of the Justice Department. It should be noted that the briefing of Kennedy was restricted to Phase One of the operation, which had ended about a year earlier. Phase Two was already under way at the time of the briefing, but Kennedy was not told of it.

As far as we know, the FBI has not been told the sensitive
operational details, but it would be naive to assume that they have
not by now put two and two together and come out with the right
answer. They know of CIA's involvement with Roselli and Giancana
as a result of the Las Vegas wiretapping incident. From the Chicago
newspaper stories of August 1963, and from Giancana's own statement,
it appears that they know this related to Cuba. When Roselli's
story reached them (Roselli to Pearson to Warren to Rowley
to the FBI), all of the pieces should have fallen into place. They
should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assassination of
Castro and used U.S. gangster elements in the operation.

There is some support for this thesis in the conversation I had
with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967 when I told him of the expected meeting
between Roselli and Harvey. Sam commented that Roselli and Giancana
have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation." He said that
he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either
Roselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your
people."

Can we plausibly deny that we plotted with gangster elements to
assassinate Castro?

No, we cannot. We are reasonably confident that there is nothing
in writing outside of the Government that would confirm Pearson's
story of the gambling syndicate operation, but there are plenty of non-gangster witnesses who could lend confirmation.

a. Maheu can confirm that Shef Edwards told Roselli that Edwards had told the Attorney General of Roselli's activities on behalf of the Government.

b. can confirm the pill and three-man team elements of the story.

c. can confirm the pill element of Phase One.

d. If an independent investigation were to be ordered, the investigators could learn everything that we have learned. Such an investigation probably would uncover details unknown to us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants.

Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?

Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy administration pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase. Phase One was initiated in August 1960 under the Eisenhower administration. Phase Two is associated in Harvey's mind with the Executive Action Capability, which reportedly was developed in response to White House urgings. Again, Phase One had been started and abandoned months before the Executive Action Capability appeared.
When Robert Kennedy was briefed on Phase One in May 1962, he strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check with the Attorney General in advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal elements. This was not done with respect to Phase Two, which was already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed. The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is found only in Phase Two: the three-man team.

What measures might be taken to lessen the damage?

We see little to be gained from personal approaches now to Mahcu, or Roselli. Mahcu has much to lose and might be able to prevail upon Roselli not to spread the story further. It is questionable whether any such urging would be effective with Roselli, because Roselli stands only to gain from having the story of his CIA connection known and accepted. We cannot now suppress the story, because it is already out and may boil up afresh from the Garrison case. If we were to approach any of the participants and urge discretion upon him, and if this became known, it would merely lend credence to a tale that now sounds somewhat improbable.
Mr. Dodd. Mr. Helms, did John McCone, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency and your immediate supervisor, know about—I gather you don't care for the word assassination plots and I am trying to find some words you and I can agree on. Let's call them efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro. Does that satisfy you?

Mr. Helms. Fine.

Mr. Dodd. Did John McCone know about the agency's efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Helms. He certainly was on top of all the operations that we mounted against Cuba. He was in the vanguard of this. He attended most of the committee meetings, he pushed certainly as hard as anyone in the administration to see if we couldn't topple the Castro regime. I believe he has testified to the effect that he did not know of what he called specific efforts to kill Castro. I don't know whether he knew about it or not. I will accept his word. I have no reason to argue with him about it. There was a big flareup at the time of the Church committee hearings over whether I had told McCone about this or whether I had told Harvey not to say anything about it. I don't have any clear recollection any more of the events surrounding that particular detail, so I cannot help you on it. I would be glad to if I could.

Mr. Dodd. So you don't know when he would have been informed, if he had been?

Mr. Helms. Then I believe he had Mr. Elder, who was his executive assistant—

Mr. Dodd. I am having a hard time hearing.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. During the Church committee hearings Mr. Elder, who had been his executive assistant, swore out an affidavit that he had been instructed by McCone to tell me that anything smacking of assassination was not permissible to Mr. McCone. Mr. Elder gave his testimony under oath. I never had any conversation with Mr. Elder like that, that I ever recall. As I have said on previous occasions and on the record, I have great regard for Mr. McCone. He was my boss. I would have no doubt whatsoever, if he had expressed himself in this fashion through one of his subordinates to me, that I would have remembered it. I think I would have remembered it. So the issue is unresolved.

Mr. Dodd. For the purposes of clarity can we talk about these efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro in terms of pre-Bay of Pigs and post-Bay of Pigs? I think for our purposes that might be of some help.

Mr. Helms. Certainly.

Mr. Dodd. Did I understand you to say that you are not sure he knew about either the pre-Bay of Pigs or the post-Bay of Pigs efforts or that he knew about the pre-Bay of Pigs and didn't know about the post-Bay of Pigs or knew about both?

Mr. Helms. I thought on one occasion I told him about the pre-Bay of Pigs episode because my recollection is that something appeared in a newspaper—I think in the Chicago Sun Times—about it, and I went and spoke to him about it and told him what was involved.

As to the post-Bay of Pigs, I don't know what he knew. You know, Mr. Dodd, I am not looking for refuge in these matters. I am
prepared to stand here and take my beating in any form that you
gentlemen want to administer it.

Mr. Dodd. We are not out to beat anyone. We are just trying to
get at the facts.

Mr. Helms. I am delighted to hear you say that. But let me just
explain as Director of the agency Mr. McCone had every opportuni-
ty to find out anything in the agency that he wanted to find out.
He had an inspection staff, he had executive assistants, he had all
kinds of people around him. So what he knew and what he didn't
know on a given date I can't possibly attest to, but I do want to
make the point that nobody was stopping him from finding out
anything he wanted to find out.

Mr. Dodd. In the Church committee report which I have marked
here as JFK exhibit F-539, reading at the bottom:

Mr. McCone testified that he was not aware of the plots to assassinate Castro
which took place during the years in which he was DCI, Director of Central
Intelligence, and that he did not authorize those plots. He testified that he was not
briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissel, Helms, or anyone else when
he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961.

Do you take issue with that?

Mr. Helms. No, I am not going to take issue with it. I would
simply end up in a lengthy hassle between me and Mr. McCone. I
have better ways to spend my time.

Mr. Dodd. So you would agree with Mr. McCone's testimony that
he was not briefed?

Mr. Helms. I have no basis for agreeing or disagreeing, Mr.
Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Can you think of any reason why you might not have
briefed him?

Mr. Helms. When he came aboard as Director I was not the
Deputy Director of Plans. It was Mr. Bissell who was the Deputy
Director of Plans, and Allen Dulles was the Director. Dulles left,
McCone took his place, and Bissell continued on as Deputy Director
of Plans for a time.

Mr. Dodd. When you became Deputy Director of Planning in
1962, can you think of any reason why you would not have told Mr.
McCone?

Mr. Helms. The episode, the pre-Bay of Pigs episode, I did talk to
him about one day, I know.

Mr. Dodd. So you did inform him of the pre-Bay of Pigs effort?

Mr. Helms. Yes. That was not when he came in 1961; it was
after that, so I guess if you parse the statement, the statement is
accurate.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK exhibit F-539 be
entered into the record at this time.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-539 is entered in
the record at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibit F-539 was received in evidence.]

[The information follows:]
The evidence indicates that the meeting between Dulles, Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime in the autumn of 1960, probably sometime in September. The minutes of a meeting of the Special Group on November 3, 1960, reflect the following remarks:

Finally, Mr. [Livingston] Merchant (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) asked whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raúl and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain, results are hazardous, and highly dangerous in conception and execution because the instruments used may be Cuban. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant’s suggestion is beyond our capabilities (Special Group Minutes, 11/3/60).

Exactly what the term “direct positive action” meant to the speaker or those listening is uncertain. Merchant was ill and unable to testify. Others present at the meeting could not recall what the words meant at the time they were uttered, although some have testified that they could refer to assassination.

Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meeting. After reading the reference to “direct positive action,” Bissell said, “I find it difficult to understand.” (Bissell, 7/17/75, p.18) He then was asked,

Q. Do you, in light of the November 3 minutes remain firm that Cabell was knowledgeable of the assassination plots?
A. It casts some doubt on that in my mind.

When asked if it cast “some significant doubt in light of (Cabell’s) character,” Bissell answered, “Yes.” (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 22-23).

(c) Did John McCone know of or authorize assassination plots during his tenure as DCI?

The CIA considered several assassination plots against Castro during McCone’s tenure as Director. Harvey initiated his contact with Rosselli in April 1962, and that operation continued into early 1963. In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated diving suit. AM/1, LANI was offered a poison pen device in November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for his use in the following years.

(i) McCone’s testimony. — McCone testified that he was not aware of the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those plots. (McCone, 6-6-75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961. (McCone, 6-6-75, pp.

1. For you read ** direct, positive action ** as meaning killing (Fidel Castro and Che Guevara).
2. "I would read it that way, yes.” (Landsdale, 7/8/73, p. 108)
3. "... would you agree that the words 'direct positive action' appear to question whether there’s been any planning in connection with assassinations (the Castros and Such)?"
4. I think the phrase ‘positive action’ could include assassinations, but ** I’m not sure what was in Mr. Merchant’s mind.” (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 9.)
154

6–7, 17), and that if he had ever been asked about the plots, he would have disapproved. McCone testified:

"I had no knowledge of any authorized plan or planning that might lead to a request for authorization. Of course, during those days it was almost common for one person or another to say, "we ought to dispose of Castro" but at no time did anyone come to me, or come to other authorities to my knowledge, with a plan for the actual undertaking of an assassination. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 3).

McCone also testified:

Senator Hart of Colorado: Did you ever discuss the subject of assassinations with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles?

McCone: No, I did not.  

(ii) Testimony of Helms, Bissell, and other Subordinate Agency Employees.—Bissell was DDP under McCone for three months from November 1961 until February 1962. Helms assumed the duties of DDP from Bissell and served throughout the balance of McCone's terms as Director.

Bissell testified about McCone's knowledge as follows:

Q. Your testimony is that you never discussed assassinations with Mr. McCone?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you tell McCone anything about that conversation with Mr. Harvey in which you at least told him to take over the relationship with the criminal syndicate?

A. I don't remember so doing. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19)

Helms testified that he did not recall ever having discussed the assassination plots with McCone while the plots were continuing. When asked whether McCone was aware of the assassination plots against Castro, Helms testified:

"No, it isn't my impression that I told him, at least I don't have any impression, unfortunately. Mr. McCone is an honorable man. He has done his own testifying, and all I can say is that I do not know specifically whether he was aware or not. (Helms, 6/15/75, pp. 99, 101–102)

Helms further testified:

Senator Mondale. I believe Mr. McCone testified that he never heard of any of these attempts when he was Director. Would you have any reason to disagree with his testimony?

Helms. Sir, I have always liked McCone and I don't want to get into an alteration with him. He had access to Harvey and everybody else just the way I had and he had regular access to the Attorney General.

Senator Mondale. If you were a member of this Committee wouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was unaware of the assassination attempts while they were underway?

Helms. I don't know how to answer that, Senator Mondale. He was involved in this up to his scuppers just the way everybody else was that was in it, and I just don't know. I have no reason to impugn his integrity. On the other hand,

1\footnote{Walt Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that Dulles gave McCone from time to time informal briefings between September and November 1961. He also said that Dulles and McCone travelled together on a briefing trip to Europe to enable McCone to get "up to speed" on CIA activities. (Elder, 8/13/75, p. 13)}

2\footnote{Helms testified that he first informed McCone about the plot using underworld figures in August 1962. See discussion supra at p. 107.}
Mr. Dodd. If I told you August 3 or August 1963 is when Mr. McCone believes that he was informed by you of the pre-Bay of Pigs efforts, would you argue with that date?

Mr. Helms. Is that when that story came out in the Sun Times? Because that is the only thing I can key it to.

Mr. Dodd. That is what he states, and I just wondered if you would argue with that.

Mr. Helms. No, certainly not.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that JFK F-538 be entered in the record at this time as well.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, JFK exhibit F-538 is admitted into evidence at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibit No. F-538 was received in evidence.]

[The information follows:]
92

face that the plots involved assassination, although Bissell and经开区
ward insist that the real meaning must have been understood. Certain
other evidence before the Committee suggests that Dulles and Cabell
did not know about the assassination plots; other evidence suggests that
they did not. (See subsection (b) below.)

(ii) McCone—McCone testified that he did not know about or
authorize the plots. Helms, Bissell, and Harvey all testified that they
did not know whether McCone knew of the assassination plots. Each
said, however, that he did not tell McCone of the assassination efforts
whenever McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961
or at any time thereafter until August 1963, when Helms gave McCone
a memorandum from which McCone concluded that the operation
with underworld figures prior to the Bay of Pigs had involved
assassination. The Inspector General's Report states that Harvey re-
ceived Helms' approval not to brief McCone when the assassination
efforts were resumed in 1962. Harvey testified this accorded with his
recollection. On other occasions when it would have been appropriate
to do so, Helms and Harvey did not tell McCone about assassination
activity. Helms did not recall any agreement not to brief McCone,
but he did not question the position taken by Harvey or the Inspector
General's Report. Helms did say that McCone never told him: not
to assassinate Castro. (These matters, as well as the various reasons
put forward by Harvey and Helms for not briefing McCone, are set
forth in Section (c) below.)

(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial Plots Against

Castro. Both Allen Dulles and General Cabell are deceased. The Commiss-

tee's investigation of this question relied on the available documents

and the testimony of those who served under Dulles and Cabell who

are still living.

(i) Dulles' Approval of J.C. King's December 1959 Memorandum—On December 11, 1959, J. C. King, head of CIA's Western

Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to Dulles observing that

a "far left" dictatorship now existed in Cuba which, "if permitted
to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other
Latin American countries.

One of King's four "Recommended Actions" was:

Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None
of those close of Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion Che Guevara
have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe
that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present
Government.

A handwritten note indicates that Dulles, with Bissell's concur-
rence, approved the recommendations.

This evidence relates to the aborted incident in July 1960 and what the Inspect-

or General's Report referred to as the initial phase of the assassination effort involving the

underworld. With respect to the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I. G. Re-

port concluded it could "find no evidence that any of the schemes were approved at any-

higher than division. If that." (I. G. Report, p. 10)

The Inspector General questioned neither Dulles nor Cabell in preparing his Report
in 1967, although both were then alive.

The Committee received this document on November 15, 1973, after printing of the
Report had begun. As a consequence, there was no opportunity to question either Dul-

lles or Bissell concerning the meaning of "elimination"; what consideration was in fact
given to Castro's "elimination," and whether any planning resulting from this document in-

led to the actual plots. In this regard it should be noted that Bissell had a "dim recol-

ly of a conversation prior to early autumn or late summer 1969 with King (the use

of the above memorandum) concerning a "capability to eliminate Castro if such a


should be decided upon." (Bissell, 6/9/73; p. 19) See p. 74.

JFK EXHIBIT F-538
Mr. Dodd. Mr. McCone testified he did not know about authorized plots. Helms, Bissell, and Harvey all testified that they did not know whether McCone knew of the assassination plots. Each said, however, he did not tell McConé of the assassination efforts either when McCone assumed the position of DCI in December 1961 or at any time thereafter until August 1963. So that would have been the first time Mr. McCone was aware of any of these efforts?

Mr. Helms. I think that is plausible. I can accept that.

Mr. Dodd. These would have been the efforts that were pre-Bay of Pigs?

Mr. Helms. That is my recollection of that particular episode, yes.

Mr. Dodd. Did you ever talk with the Warren Commission or anyone on the Warren Commission staff about these efforts to get rid of Castro?

Mr. Helms. No, sir. I might point out in fairness to all concerned that that was not my function in those days. If anybody was going to be briefing the Warren Commission about ongoing operations of any kind in the CIA, it would have been the Director or with the Director’s authority.

Mr. Dodd. In other words, you talked about these plots to no one who had any connection whatsoever with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Not that I know of; no.

Mr. Dodd. I would like to, if I could, refer to page 17—I hope we have the same copies—of the now declassified August 9 executive session testimony that you gave before this committee.

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have page 17.

Mr. Dodd. You can read along with me. Mr. Helms is responding to a question by Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Helms. Excuse me, did you say you wanted me to read it?

Mr. Dodd. No. I will read it and you may read along with me.

On the bottom of page 16:

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the agency’s investigation reflect any working hypotheses? By that, did the agency give any particular emphasis to the particular areas, geographic areas?

Mr. Helms. I think that the entire U.S. Government, not only the CIA, was very concerned as to whether there would be evidence of some foreign conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubans were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may have been involved in it.

Then dropping to the next paragraph, second sentence:

There is hardly any question there was more discussed during those days as to who was behind Lee Harvey Oswald, if indeed he was the man who was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done the things he had done, and so forth.

Then dropping down to the last paragraph here on this page beginning with the sentence:

I think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, I would like to make a comment about the various investigations into the assassination of President Kennedy based on the long years I have spent in the intelligence business, and that is, until the day that the RGB in Moscow or the Cuban intelligence in Havana is prepared to turn over their files to the United States as to what their relationships to these various people were, it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally and conclusively.

It seems to me that the question of possible Cuban complicity was, according to your testimony, on the minds of a lot of people.
This was not something that came up later, but right at the very time. Isn't that correct? In fact, this morning you said in response to a question from Chairman Stokes that you certainly were aware that the alleged assassin Lee Harvey Oswald had sought a visa at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. Is that correct?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. And you were aware that the alleged assassin Lee Harvey Oswald had lived for more than 2 years in the Soviet Union; is that correct?

Mr. Helms. Right.

Mr. Dodd. And you were aware that Lee Harvey Oswald had passed out Fair Play for Cuba materials in New Orleans; is that correct?

Mr. Helms. I believe it is.

Mr. Dodd. In light of all of that knowledge, in light of the obvious interest and emphasis that the entire U.S. Government had on the possible activities of the Cuban Government, and in light of the fact that you knew that Lee Harvey Oswald had engaged in these activities, why didn't you tell the Warren Commission about the efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro or to overthrow the Cuban Government?

Mr. Helms. Mr. Dodd, you are singling me out as to why I didn't march up and tell the Warren Commission when these operations against Cuba were known to the Attorney General of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the President of the United States himself although he at that point was dead. All kinds of people knew about these operations high up in the Government. Why am I singled out as the fellow who should have gone up and identified a Government operation to get rid of Castro? It was a Government wide operation, supported by the Defense Department, supported by the National Security Council, supported by almost everybody in a high position in the Government.

Mr. Dodd. According to your earlier testimony, you have made note of the fact and I think the record indicates that the Attorney General had asked that they be stopped. I presume he was told that they would be. So far as he was concerned, they had ended.

Mr. Helms. What about some connection with the Mafia? But the efforts to unseat Castro under Operation Mongoose had gone on full blast under the Attorney General's direction and we had the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962. If the Cuban missile crisis with the connivance of Fidel Castro and the Soviet leaders had been a success, those missiles would have been introduced to Cuba and the United States would have been hostage to those missiles of the Soviets. It would have been the coup of the century.

In December of 1962 the brigade comes back to the United States having been bought off with drug supplies by the Attorney General, et cetera. President Kennedy went to the Orange Bowl in Miami and greeted them in December 1962 and assured them, and this may not be an exact quote, as follows: "I will return this banner to this brigade in a free Havana."

Those operations went on nonstop during 1963. If that doesn't indicate there was bad blood between President Kennedy and Fidel Castro, I don't know what does.
Mr. Dodd. But my point is this, according to your testimony, Mr. McConne was not aware of the post-Bay of Pigs efforts and attempts. Robert Kennedy, the then Attorney General, asked that all activities such as that be stopped. Mr. McConne is not aware. I can't ask you why others who had knowledge of this, did not communicate it to the Warren Commission.

But as I read your executive committee testimony, you felt you had, not the link with the Warren Commission but had a very active role in communicating with the Warren Commission. That doesn't help me in trying to understand why you would not have made that information available and known to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Helms. Well, I am sorry, I didn't.

Mr. Dodd. In retrospect, do you think it was relevant?

Mr. Helms. In retrospect, Mr. Dodd, I would have done a lot of things very differently. I would like to point out something since we are so deeply into this. When one government is trying to upset another government and the operation is successful, people get killed. I don't know whether they are assassinated or whether they are killed in a coup. We had one recently in Afghanistan. The head of the Afghanistan Government was killed. Was he assassinated or killed in a coup? I don't know.

These semantics are all great. I want to say there is not a chief of state or chief of government in the world today who is not aware of the fact that his life is in jeopardy. He takes every possible protection to guard himself. The relevance of one plot or another plot and its effect on the course of events I would have a very hard time assessing and I think you would, too.

Suppose I had gone down and told them and said, yes, you know we tried to do this. How would it have altered the outcome of the Warren Commission proceeding?

Mr. Dodd. Wasn't that really for the Warren Commission to determine?

Mr. Helms. I think that is absolutely correct, but they did not have that chance apparently.

Mr. Dodd. That is right.

Mr. Helms. I don't want to take the sole blame for the fact that they didn't have that chance.

Mr. Dodd. I am not asking you to.

Mr. Helms. Well, the implication of the hearing is to that effect.

Mr. Dodd. You have to take these things in the entire context. This is not the only hearing we are having. Prior to the issuance of the Warren Commission's report, did the Agency at any time have any documents or other information which might have indicated that Mr. Castro may have known about some of these efforts to get rid of him?

Mr. Helms. I don't know that. I have heard these allegations flying around. I don't know whether they are accurate or not. I have heard allegations of newspaper stories that Mr. Castro knew or didn't know. Eminent Senators of the United States have taxed me with the fact they knew that Castro knew Mr. Cubela was a double agent. Mr. Cubela gets up in Havana not long ago and says Mr. Castro did not know he was a double agent; and Mr. Castro
testified to this committee that he didn’t know he had any connections with the CIA.

Who is right in all of this?

Mr. DODD. That is what we are trying to find out.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I can’t contribute anything.

Mr. DODD. Was there any effort to investigate whether or not Castro or the Cuban Government was aware of these efforts?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think that we used what few resources we had in Cuba. But after all, you must remember that the whole object of this exercise at the time was to get intelligence on Cuba of any kind and it was turning out to be extraordinarily difficult and the U.S. Government made a major effort to get intelligence on Cuba during this period of months.

Mr. DODD. I am not in any way trying to be harassing, Mr. Helms, when I ask these questions. But you stated earlier that there were other people that were aware of these efforts to get rid of Castro and that they might have had a responsibility as well to communicate that to the Warren Commission.

Mr. HELMS. Well, they might have communicated to the Warren Commission the operations that were being run against Cuba which were certainly advertised to the Cubans because people began getting arrested. I mean, task forces would land. The people would be arrested. I have no doubt they were interrogated. Therefore, Castro knew these efforts were being made against him.

Now, if you want to single out the assassination plot involving the Mafia as one thing and you want to circumscribe it and separate it from all these other things, exactly who knew about it and who might have told the Warren Commission, I am not dead certain.

Mr. DODD. I want to try to determine, if I could, whether or not it was a conscious decision on your part not to inform the Warren Commission or was it just something that you didn’t think should be done at the time?

Mr. HELMS. It never occurred to me. We never talked to anybody outside the Agency about covert operations of any kind—that perhaps was a mistake—except to the Senate and House committees to whom we reported.

Mr. DODD. But as I understand your statement, you believe today that that was a mistake?

Mr. HELMS. I think it was a mistake, no doubt about it. I think we should have shoved the whole thing over. I would have backed up a truck and taken all the documents down and put them on the Warren Commission’s desk.

Mr. DODD. I notice in your executive testimony and earlier today in previous testimony it was your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to the Commission’s requests.

Mr. HELMS. Basically that was the case. I imagine that if anything came into the Agency which seemed to be of fundamental interest to them, we would have volunteered it, but basically we felt our role was to respond to Warren Commission requests and not to try and get out in front of them or to try and second-guess them or anything else. I mean the Commission.
Mr. Dodd. But fundamentally it was on a request basis. You were not necessarily volunteering information?

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Dodd. I would like to refer you to JFK exhibit F-520. I would ask the clerk to give Mr. Helms a copy of that exhibit, so that he has it in front of him.

[The information follows:]
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD

1. This memorandum is for information and for action. The proposed lines of action are indicated in paragraph 4.

2. The Cuban Intelligence Service defector has produced information of interest to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Staff learned of this on 30 April. A questionnaire was submitted by the Staff on 1 May (Attachment A). Mr. , who is handling the debriefing, provided a reply on 5 May (Attachment B). It was clear from Mr.'s summary that he had information bearing on the OSWALD relationship with the Cuban Embassy and Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City, albeit his knowledge was not that of a direct participant in matters affecting OSWALD. A follow-up questionnaire was submitted to Mr. on 6 May (Attachment C). Mr. 's reply was dated 8 May (Attachment D). Attention is directed particularly to the content of paragraph two of Attachment D.

3. We have the problem of reconciling the operational exploitation of and satisfying the responsibilities we have undertaken with Mr. Rankin. is such an operational gold mine that Mr. wants, at a maximum, two months to work fully. It is palpable, however, that we must furnish to the Commission the substance of...
information on OSWALD before that. On the previous record of our association with the Commission, particularly with Mr. Rankin, it seems possible for the Agency to work out an arrangement with Mr. Rankin personally that would take care of their needs and ours after a frank discussion of the equities.

4. It is recommended that the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT General: Debriefing of
Specific: The Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964

1. Reference is made to a telephone conversation yesterday with Chief, Staff concerning this matter.

2. Because I am not aware of the information already available to the Commission investigating the Oswald Case or furnished by the Agency, my debriefing of the Source has been based on the questions prepared by the Staff and on what the Source answers have suggested. I shall be glad to pursue any other topics suggested by Staff.

3. The Following information in addition to that in the reference might be of interest:

a. Luisa CALDERON, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.

b. Source has known CALDERON for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empresa Transmport". Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

c. Luisa CALDERON was transferred directly from her position in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce to a post in México, a matter of surprise to the Source.

d. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (DCI pseudo MGCOS), shortly before he left Cuba for Mexico on or about 15 April 1964, saw CALDERON.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debriefing of dated 5 May 1964

1. The source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.

   A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

   B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source's information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DGI, specifically Luisa CALDERON, Manual VEGA Perez and Rosalia RODRIGUEZ Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-63 and 11-22-63.

   A) What does source mean by contact?

   B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

   C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?

   D) What was the purpose of these contacts?
E) If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what protests, if any, were employed in contacting him?

F) Did source ever see any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?

G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camera equipment to cover these contacts.

H) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.

3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?

4. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?

5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.
08 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT General : Debriefing of
Specific : The Oswald Case

REFERENCE : A. Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964
B. Blind Memorandum dated 07 May 1964
C. Conversations between Staff and

1. When the Oswald Case first was discussed with the Source, the specific questions prepared by Staff were posed. The answers given by the Source were reported in Reference A. That memorandum which I dictated to a Staff stenographer appears accurate except for sentence #9 which should have said that the only possible "fabrication" known by Source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO, on a television program, of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.

2. On 07 and 08 May 1964 I further discussed the Oswald Case with the Source in order to clarify exactly what he knew and what he had heard. In the light of the explanation given by him, I believe that a clearer understanding of what he knows can be reached if I record his knowledge without using the question and answer format. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs I shall report all the information given by the Source paraphrasing his explanations and comments.

"I have no personal knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities and I do not know that OSWALD was an agent of the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) or any other directorate or department of the Cuban Government.

I first heard of OSWALD after the assassination of President Kennedy when news media carried the name of OSWALD. Personnel in the DGI first commented about the case. So far as I can recall, one day after lunch when a group of officers, of whom I was one, were chatting. The officers present were about ten including Roberto SANTISTEBAN, Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo, Andres ARMONA, Pedro FARINAS Diaz and
Manuel VEGA Perez. Manuel VEGA Perez previously had been assigned to Mexico in the Cuban Consulate where he was the principal intelligence officer of the DGI. VEGA mentioned that OSWALD had gone to the Cuban Consulate two or three times in connection with a visa application during the time that VEGA was in Mexico. I gathered, although I do not know that VEGA made any specific statement to this effect, that VEGA personally had seen OSWALD. I well could have reached this conclusion because normally VEGA and his assistant in Mexico for the DGI, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, would see persons applying for a visa to go to Cuba. This is because DGI officers are charged with expediting the granting of visas of agents of the DGI. Such agents on appearing at the Consulate use a special phrase to indicate their relationship with the DGI. (I do not know the particular phrase used in every case. I do know that agents from El Salvador in requesting visas always made mention of the name "Mauricio".) The DGI officers at a Consulate interview visa applicants to find out if they are agents. If the visa applicant does not use one of the indicated phrases, the DGI officers, instead of granting the visa immediately, tell the applicant to return in a few days. The officer then notifies Habana and requests authority for the visa. I cannot recall if VEGA even made the statement that he had requested permission to issue a visa to OSWALD, but I feel sure that he would have done so because VEGA had said that OSWALD had returned several times and this would be the usual procedure.

I believe that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez also would have seen OSWALD because he worked with VEGA and also would have screened visa applicants.

I thought that Luisa CALDERON might have had contact with OSWALD because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told by a DGI case officer named Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo.
HERNANDEZ had investigated Luisa CALDERON. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name as OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by HERNANDEZ should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understood the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa CALDERON. After the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been OSWALD.

The only other person about whom you asked me in connection with this, whom I recall, is Sylvia DURAN and I know very little about her.

We saw a pretty girl standing at the end of the reception room, and someone asked who she was, and one of the group said it was Sylvia DURAN
I recall that, after the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, orders were issued for all offices of the DGI, at Headquarters and in the field, to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), or "importantes" (important). The material, once packaged, was to be held pending further instructions. All travel by DGI officers and all DGI pouches were suspended temporarily.

In addition, I recall that DGI Headquarters personnel were instructed either to remain in the DGI Headquarters offices or to keep the DGI aware of their whereabouts so that they could be reached immediately. I do not know the reason for these measures but I believe it logical that they were issued because of the possibility that the United States might take some type of action against Cuba and the DGI offices. As nearly as I can recall, we were able to unpack DGI files and use them normally about the 3rd of December 1963.

3. In brief, the Source does not claim to have any significant information concerning the assassination of President Kennedy or about the activities of OSWALD. If the paraphrased comments of the Source are considered to need further clarification, I suggest that Mr. [name], who is most familiar with the details of the OSWALD Case, talk to the Source. This can be arranged at any time.
Mr. Dodd. This exhibit, Mr. Helms, is dated May 11, 1964. It is a memorandum that was prepared for your review. The subject of the memorandum is information regarding Lee Harvey Oswald provided to the CIA by a Cuban defector.

Mr. Helms. Which part of it, Mr. Dodd, would you like me to look at?

Mr. Dodd. Do you recall the document? Just looking at it, does it refresh your memory?

Mr. Helms. I had better look at it a little more carefully. I have no doubt it is in my packet of papers. Yes, sir, I have been through it now.

Mr. Dodd. And you recognize this as a memorandum that was prepared for your review and it does involve information regarding Lee Harvey Oswald provided to the CIA by a Cuban defector?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. All right. I will read paragraphs 3 and 4 here if you want to follow along with me, beginning on paragraph 3:

We have the problem of reconciling the operational exploitation of blank—

The name having been sanitized here—

and satisfying the responsibilities we have undertaken with Mr. Rankin, blank is such an operational goldmine that Mr. Blank wants at a maximum 2 months to work fully. It is palpable, however, that we must furnish to the Commission the substance of blank.

It looks like.

Then paragraph 4:

It is recommended that the DDP in turn or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the blank situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience, either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing.

Doesn't this language here indicate that in this particular instance anyway, the Agency was contemplating volunteering this defector's information to the Warren Commission without a specific request from the Commission itself?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I think that is right, sir. That is what it looks like to me.

Mr. Dodd. Let me ask you this: Why did you feel in this case that the Commission should be privy to this information? Why did you volunteer this information?

Mr. Helms. Well, I can only assume from reading this, since I don't have any independent recollection of exactly what this defector was saying, that it was so obvious to all of us that it would be of interest to the work of the Commission that we wanted to get it in their hands.

In saying earlier today that we reacted both to the time and in response to questions, I didn't mean to imply that we never volunteered anything, particularly if it seemed that the Commission ought to have it, at least in our judgment it seemed that the Commission ought to have it.

Mr. Dodd. I noticed earlier today in response to Mr. Stokes' question you voluntarily went, I presume, to the Chief Justice at the time and communicated to him about the reliability of Nosenko's testimony with regard to Oswald?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, it was certainly voluntary because we were very concerned at the time.

Mr. Dodd. These were pieces of information that the Warren Commission would not on its own have had access to as a result of their own work?

Mr. Helms. I think that is correct.

Mr. Dodd. And certainly it was as well, a conscious decision on the part of the Agency and yourself that both of these pieces of information were relevant to the investigation by the Commission?

Mr. Helms. That is correct, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Now I come back again, Mr. Helms—I suppose it is a constant difficulty I have. I can see and appreciate why you would feel that the defector's information was relevant. I can certainly see why the question of the reliability of Mr. Nosenko with regard to his information with regard to Oswald was relevant.

I have this terrible problem of trying to understand why, albeit today you recognize it was a mistake, but why—when you back in 1964 recognize the relevancy of those two pieces of information—there was a lack of understanding as to the relevancy of attempts on our part to destabilize or get rid of Fidel Castro. That is the difficulty I have.

Mr. Helms. I can understand your difficulty, Mr. Dodd. I am just sorry. It is an untidy world.

Mr. Dodd. Other than the anti-Castro assassination plots, was there any other information pertaining to a possible mode or means or opportunity to kill the President that you are aware of and that Warren Commission was not told about?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I don't get the—

Mr. Dodd. Other than the assassination plots. We know about the defector, you volunteered that. We had the voluntary turning over of the opinion with regard to Nosenko. We know today we didn't turn over relevant information with regard to these efforts to get rid of Castro.

Are there other things that you can recall that might have had relevancy—things of importance, to the Warren Commission's investigation of the assassination of an American President.

Mr. Helms. Well, I don't know of any others. I can't think of what they might have been, but then we might have been guilty of some other errors of omission, I don't know. None come readily to mind. This didn't come readily to mind at the time.

Mr. Dodd. You said earlier that you informed President Johnson of the anti-Castro plots or the efforts to get rid of Castro.

Mr. Helms. Yes, I did.

Mr. Dodd. Do you recall when he would have become aware of that?

Mr. Helms. I guess he became aware of it when I told him, although I believe there were some allegations in a column by Drew Pearson. Yes, I think that is correct, that there was a column by Drew Pearson and then maybe some lawyer in town, a friend of his, made some mention of this to President Johnson. It was responsive to this inquiry from him that I gave him the information.

Mr. Dodd. And he was told specifically about the CIA's efforts to get rid of Castro?

Mr. Helms. Yes, he was.
Mr. Dodd. Was he told specifically about the CIA—organized crime connection?

Mr. Helms. That is the thing we were talking about. It was about the operations to get rid of Castro. They were ongoing even in his administration.

Mr. Dodd. Let me ask you when that would have been? I think in your executive testimony you said May 10, 1967.

Mr. Helms. If that is what I said in the executive testimony, I believe that to be the correct date on which I did this. That is my belief. I did my best to reconstruct when it was, in recent times. If it is a mistake, it is a mistake, but it is an honest one. It is my recollection of when I did this.

Mr. Dodd. Is it further your testimony that President Johnson was aware of the so-called AMLASH plot?

Mr. Helms. I gave him what I recollect is a good fill-in on what we were trying to do. The AMLASH operation was a political action operation to get a political grouping together to unseat Castro. I recognized it in one of the documents, because I noticed it the other day in this group of documents, some officer in the Cuban operations testified to the fact that that was referred to consistently in the group as an assassination operation. That is not my recollection of the case. It was not an assassination operation or designed for that purpose.

I think that I do know what I am talking about here, but there are other witnesses to that. Mr. FitzGerald is dead, but there are other gentlemen who worked with him at the time.

Mr. Dodd. As you said in your earlier testimony, it is semantics that we are having trouble with.

Mr. Helms. If you are the target, there is a great deal of difference whether somebody is thinking of doing something to you 10 miles from here and actually doing something. I don’t mean to indulge too much in semantics, but it is a question of whether anything happened or not.

Mr. Dodd. That is not the question. We are talking about what was planned to happen.

Mr. Helms. The AMLASH operation was designed to try and get this man to organize a political action operation and a military operation to get rid of Castro. It was he who kept saying that the fastest way to do this is to kill the man. But this didn’t mean that the Agency was interested in that aspect of the thing and the primary reason for being in touch with him was quite the opposite. We were trying to do various things to rein him in.

Mr. Dodd. It was not suggested that there be a democratic election to unseat Castro?

Mr. Helms. I should say not. But if you go through the records of those years, you will find it was the whole U.S. Government was behind this one.

Mr. Dodd. Well, could you distinguish this one, then, from the other ones? You didn’t want to characterize the other efforts as assassination plots or efforts to single out and get rid of Castro? This one you describe as more of a political operation. I am having a difficult time distinguishing the earlier ones if they are to be distinguished.
Mr. Helms. Well, I think it goes back, Mr. Dodd, to what I was saying a few minutes ago where one government mounts operations to unseat another government, at what point does what word become what word. You are trying to unseat them and you are trying to unseat them by the means at your disposal. Some may be shooting with guns. Others will take off and go to the hills. Others might be that you could arrest them and put them in jail. You know this as well as I do. It is the history of the world. There are coups constantly going on.

All I am trying to say is the U.S. Government had a policy for many months of trying to mount a coup against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Dodd. I would like to draw your attention to JFK-527. I would ask the clerk to show the witness, Mr. Helms, a copy of this exhibit.

Mr. Helms, as they bring it over to you, this is page 94 of the CIA's 1967 Inspector General's report. Do you have a copy of it there?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I do. I think this is correct. Is this about the AMLASH meeting?

Mr. Dodd. There you go; that is the proper one. Again, just to make sure I understood you, your testimony was that you didn't consider AMLASH to be an assassination plot? It was more of a political operation?

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Dodd. OK. Now let me read the section where you identified the document. I am reading what is underlined here, and I think for the purpose of the record it is important to note that the underlining was done by the Inspector General. It was not done by the committee.

It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro.

Now, again, I am reading from the same report that we read from earlier. They are calling it an assassination device. Are we getting semantical here again?

Mr. Helms. No. I think the device, that was a hypodermic with some kind of poison in it——

Mr. Dodd. I am having a hard time hearing you, Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms. I believe it was a hypodermic syringe they had given him with something called Black Leaf-40 in it. This was in response to AMLASH request that he be provided with some sort of a device whereby he could kill Castro. He returned this device on the spot to the case officer. The case officer brought it back to Washington and that was the end of the plot.

Mr. Dodd. OK, but for purposes of discussion, the officer gave this Cuban, this agent in Paris, a device with that material you described in it. I presume the material, if injected into a human being, would kill him; is that right?

Mr. Helms. I would think so, yes.

Mr. Dodd. So the officer gives the Cuban agent the device to kill somebody.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry he didn't give him a pistol, because it would have made the whole thing a lot simpler and less exotic.
Mr. Dodd. Well, whether it is a pistol or a needle, if AMLASH is a political plot to destabilize the government, what in the blazes are we giving an agent a device to kill Castro for if it is not an assassination plot?

Mr. Helms. Well, if you want to have it that way, why don't you just have it that way.

Mr. Dodd. It is not what I want.

Mr. Helms. I think it is what you want.

Mr. Dodd. I am reading to you from reports prepared at your request by the Inspector General. I'm not fabricating, I am quoting.

Mr. Helms. I understand that.

Mr. Dodd. Well, it is not a question of what I want. It is a question of what this committee would like to know, and the committee is not satisfied, I don't believe, at this point as to exactly what the characterization of AMLASH was.

Mr. Helms. Well, I have told you what I believe the characterization of AMLASH to be.

Mr. Dodd. What does that have to do with this?

Mr. Helms. Because we gave him a gun or hypodermic syringe or whatever the case may be at his request because he had aims on Castro. If that is your definition of an assassination plot, then have it that way. It is quite satisfactory with me.

Mr. Dodd. But it is your characterization that it would not be——

Mr. Helms. No; it is not. He didn't accept the weapon. If we gave him a gun and he gave it back, there is no way he was going to make an assassination or murder with that particular device, was there?

Mr. Dodd. It is not a question of what he wanted to do. It is what we were trying to do by giving him this device that is important. That is what I am driving at.

Mr. Helms. Is it important? I thought you had Mr. Cubela testifying that they never even knew he was in touch with the CIA. So how is it relevant to the hearings of this committee, let alone the Warren Commission?

Mr. Dodd. I would suggest to you that it might be relevant, if, in fact, Mr. Castro was aware of the fact that we were engaging in an activity designed to cause his early demise.

Mr. Helms. Well, if he didn't know it, he could have guessed it.

Mr. Dodd. To the best of your knowledge, Mr. Helms, was the AMLASH operation, well, I guess called in in-house jargon a secure operation, an operation where to your knowledge there were not any leaks.

Mr. Helms. The allegations I believe have been made by some officer connected with it that he felt there had been leaks.

Mr. Dodd. I am sorry. I didn't hear you.

Mr. Helms. The allegation I believe has been made by some officer connected with the operation that there were leaks, that it was not a secure operation. The merits of that allegation I do not know. I know that the Senate committee seemed to feel that this was the case and I believe they came to the conclusion that it was a double agent operation.
I never believed that it was a double agent operation. I am now supported by Mr. Castro and Mr. Cubela. I don’t know whether that support gives me any solace or not.

Mr. Dodd. Just a second ago you said even if he didn’t know, he could have guessed anyway.

Mr. Helms. Sure.

Mr. Dodd. I will ask that JFK exhibit F-527 be entered into the record at this point.

Mr. Fithian [presiding]. Without objection it is admitted.

[JFK exhibit F-527 was entered previously.]

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Helms, I would like to show you JFK exhibit F-512. This is an affidavit that was prepared by an individual who no longer works with the Agency. The name at the top is a fictitious name, not his real name.

Mr. Helms. That is known in the jargon as a cryptonym.

Mr. Dodd. Then, Joseph H. Langosch is a cryptonym. This individual is a person who has extensive experience in counterintelligence matters related to CIA operations against Cuba.

In fact, quoting from his background here, he worked for the Agency from 1955 to 1968. During 1963, he functioned in two capacities as a CIA officer, the first capacity being as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Special Affairs staff, and the second capacity being as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs staff.

During 1963, the Special Affairs staff was the CIA staff responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban intelligence services and that as Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs staff he was responsible for safeguarding the Special Affairs staff against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Service. So he was directly involved here on page 4.

Mr. Helms. He is the man I was talking about a few moments ago when I said somebody identified with the operation made the allegation that this was an assassination plot. The gentleman may have heard somebody say this, but I had not heard anybody say it. I had occasion to ask if this was the common talk in the SAS staff from someone else who was there in a high position and I am told it was not.

So, I don’t know the merits of the case. I have no reason to put the man down on his affidavit, but on the other hand this was not my understanding of it.

Mr. Dodd. Well, for the purpose of the record, for the other committee members who may not be aware of his statement in the affidavit, he says that the AMLASH operation might have been an insecure operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy because it was highly possible that as of 1962 the Cuban Intelligence Services had knowledge of the CIA’s association with persons involved in the AMLASH operation, including AMLASH 1, also known as blank, and that the information which led him to doubt the security of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was available to senior level CIA officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. And the last paragraph states that the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond
FitzGerald, and other very senior CIA officials, as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. HELMS. It is interesting to me that a man who is so close to Mr. FitzGerald spells his name wrong.

Mr. DODD. How do you spell the name?

Mr. HELMS. It has a capital G.

Mr. DODD. That may not be his fault. That may be the stenographer's fault.

Mr. HELMS. But he has all kinds of initials in the margin here in which he made certain corrections. He would have had the opportunity to take note of that, too, I would think.

Mr. DODD. We will take note of that. Obviously, you have had some experience in intelligence work. Would you like to comment on this aside from that?

Mr. HELMS. You know, it is an interesting fact that this committee knows more about the truth of the assertions than I do because you have talked to Cuban officials. The meeting in Cuba at which Cubela testified has occurred within the last 2 or 3 months, and I imagine in the two trips that this committee has made to Havana—at least the newspapers tell me it has been two trips—you have had a chance to satisfy yourself perhaps as to whether the operation was insecure or not.

The Cuban position seems to indicate that it was secure, that they did not know about it. That is why I say it is interesting. I have nothing to contribute myself. I don't know whether it was insecure or not. I can only tell you, though, that intelligence officers are just as human as most people and the fellow who doesn't feel that maybe he was properly appreciated at one time in his career is always glad to get back at his superiors by saying he was the one who was right and they were the ones who were wrong.

Mr. DODD. Fine. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would terminate my line of questioning and turn back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Mr. Helms.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Dodd. Thank you very much.

Mr. FITTHIAN. We were not sure, Mr. Dodd, that you had a balance of time, but we do want to thank you for your exhaustive questioning.

I think the plan here, Mr. Helms, is very soon to go back to the counsel, but I am going to exercise the prerogative of the Chair because I have a plane to catch and I want to ask a couple of questions before I leave.

Mr. Helms, the fact that Oswald was in possession of information of some sort on U.S. radar equipment and radar operating procedures at the time he defected or attempted to defect to Russia in 1959 is of some interest to us. Some people claim that he might have had knowledge of the U-2 spy plane performance characteristics as well, although that is less certain.

But we are certain at least about the radar information. He told a State Department official, as you testified this morning I believe, in Moscow in 1959 that he intended to give this information to the Soviets.

My question is: Was the CIA aware of Oswald's defection and the extent of his radar training in 1959?
Mr. HELMS. I don't know, Mr. Fithian. My impression was that we first heard of his defection to the Soviet Union through State Department channels. Having been a marine and therefore a responsibility of the Navy Department, I think the Agency would not have gotten very close to Mr. Oswald. They would not have regarded him as part of our responsibility.

Mr. FITHIAN. So then the Agency, though aware, I would presume there is some procedure for Americans, for your handling or someone handling American attempts to defect?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. He went to the Embassy in Moscow, and the ordinary Consuls would have handled this affair.

Mr. FITHIAN. And you or the Agency would not have been, under a routine arrangement, have been alerted by the State Department?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think we would have heard from the State Department and I believe that we did hear from the State Department. We would have had no jurisdiction in the case.

Mr. FITHIAN. Would you, would the Agency then not have—as a matter of practice—not have inquired of DOD or someone as to how much damage to our U-2 operation, let's say, theorized, that Oswald might be able to do by the defecting?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. We might have, but I would have thought that the feeling would be that that was the Navy Department's responsibility.

Mr. FITHIAN. Is it your best assessment that in all probability the Agency did not make any effort to assess the potential damage of Oswald's—

Mr. HELMS. I think that is right. In other words, he was another Marine, but what specialty he had or what he had been involved with, I don't think we would have gone into that unless it were volunteered to us in some form.

Mr. FITHIAN. Then the return of a defector to the United States, as Oswald did in 1962, is that—would that trigger an action by the Agency to interview him?

Mr. HELMS. Normally it would have, except that he would have been regarded by the Agency as a member or a Reserve member from the Defense Department, and therefore it would have been up to the Navy to take him over and talk to him.

Mr. FITHIAN. Now, I thank you for your assessment. I would like your best guess on this. I doubt that you have any specific information, though you may.

Given your work in the whole field of intelligence, is it reasonable for this committee to assume that with Oswald's background and his attempt to defect, that he would be "an uninteresting target" to the KGB?

Mr. HELMS. I simply do not understand that assertion. I would have thought, to begin with, that any American who went to the Russian Government and said, "I want to defect to the Soviet Union" would have immediately been taken over by the KGB to find out what his game was because, after all, the KGB's charter is to protect the Soviet state against infiltration.

How would they know that he was serious about this? How would they know that the CIA had not sent him to make a fake defection and to try to get into Soviet society through this device?
So for that reason, if not for many others, I find it quite incredible, the assertion by Nosenko that Oswald was never interrogated or was never in touch with the KGB while he was in the Soviet Union. This really stretches one’s credulity. It goes back to the testimony this morning that this is the hardest thing about the whole Nosenko case to swallow, and I have not been able to swallow it in all these years.

Mr. FITHIAN. Then my own belief that it is highly improbable that the KGB would have so acted, you would not find that too far off base?

Mr. HELMS. No. In other words, I would have thought they would have grabbed him immediately.

Mr. FITHIAN. With all of that, and that is where I sort of come down to, this did not rule out him becoming a bona fide agent as far as the Agency was concerned? That is, it did not rule out coming down favorably on his own as far as the Agency was concerned?

Mr. HELMS. You see, I don’t know whether you were here this morning when we were talking about this.

Mr. FITHIAN. Yes, I was.

Mr. HELMS. I realize that the publications are full of sentences saying that the Agency considered or made the judgment that Nosenko was bona fide. When we speak about the Agency, we are speaking about an organization, and normally when an organization is going to take a position, the various people in it decide that this is the position that ought to be taken and there is some record made of this.

I don’t ever recall having taken a position in writing or a firm, final position about Nosenko’s bona fides. I did make a decision that he was to be resettled. I feel that there is no basis for me to waver in my feelings here.

When I was talking this morning, I omitted to make a point in connection with that memorandum which I signed off on and which is a matter of your record here now in the committee hearings so there is no need to get the document.

But in that April 2 memorandum of 1963, which I signed off on, there were various steps outlined in the attachment to the memorandum about the resettling of Nosenko and I would like to read step 5 for the benefit of the committee because I think it is relevant here.

I said:

When we have favorably resolved this agreement within the Agency as to his bona fides, we will allow him his ultimate freedom, including assistance in finding suitable employment. If disagreement persists, however, as to his bona fides beyond the end of this calendar year, we will consult with other appropriate Government agencies as to whether he may be allowed full freedom as a nonresident alien or whether the security of the United States require his deportation.

I have a note here that I misread the date on the copy I have of the memorandum. Maybe my eyesight is not very good here; 1969 was the date of the memorandum. I am sorry. It is such a bad copy. It is April 2, 1969.

In any event, if the Agency records do not have in them a memorandum which bears my signature which says that this Attorney’s position is that Nosenko is bona fide, I think that would b
out my recollection that I never made a final decision on the subject.

Mr. FITHIAN. My problem—and this is an opinion rather than a question, Mr. Ambassador—my problem is that as I look over this, I find it extremely difficult, as I have indicated, to accept that they would have—to accept Nosenko's story with regard to the KGB activity or nonactivity.

I find it almost equally impossible to understand why, in the face of this, which was considered by many the crucial question about Nosenko, why we as a Government continued to pay him the kind of money that we went over this morning in testimony.

I find, as a matter of fact, I find both of these about equally implausible, if I can come back to this.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think, sir, that you must realize, Mr. Fithian, that one has difficulty handling these defectors. What do you do with them? I mean, do you put them on welfare? This is really one of the problems. Defectors are encouraged to come to this country because they do have information that is denied to the United States in these closed societies and otherwise. They have been very useful in the information they have turned over.

I am told that Mr. Nosenko, in certain categories, has made a very useful contribution to American intelligence. But if you have the man on your hands, and even if he is not turning out to be particularly useful, do you want him wandering around as a public charge? I don't think we do.

Now you can get down to the details of whether he is being paid the correct amount or not. I think that is Admiral Turner's responsibility now. I have not had to deal with this matter for 5 years. I prefer that you ask him if he thinks he is worth it now.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Goldsmith is recognized for a few additional questions on direct.

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a question? Mr. PREYER. The Chair recognizes Mr. Blakey.

Mr. BLAKEY. Ambassador Helms, I have not, up until this point, asked questions in our hearing before. I had an occasion several years ago in a public forum to ask a question of Mr. Colby along the lines of what I would like to ask you now. I wonder if you would respond to it.

You had a conversation with Congressman Dodd in which you discussed the pre-Bay of Pigs plots involving the Mafia and the post-Bay of Pigs involving the Mafia. You raised some question in your mind as to which of the plots were serious in the sense that they contemplated more than the overthrow of Castro, but more particularly his personal assassination. I found the factual discussion extremely interesting.

Let me change the focus and direction, if I might. Let me ask you a moral question, not a legal question, not a practical question, but a moral question: Would you tell me and the members of this committee and maybe the American people what possibly could have been the moral justification for the CIA entering into an alliance with the Mafia to execute the President of a foreign country?
Mr. HELMS. There was none. I have apologized for this. I can’t do any more than apologize on public television that it was an error in judgment on my part. There was great pressure on us at that time to try to find connections in Cuba. For my part in this and to the extent I had anything to do with it, I am heart sorry. I cannot do any more than apologize.

Mr. BLAKEY. I understand you say there was no moral justification for it.

Mr. HELMS. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Goldsmith?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-518. I might state for the record that JFK F-518 is a summary, a partial summary, of a conversation involving a woman named Luisa Calderon who was identified as having possible connections with DGI, Cuban Intelligence.

Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission into the record of this exhibit.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the exhibit is ordered admitted into the record at this time.

[The information follows:]

SUBJECT : Comments of Luisa CALDERON Carralero

1. A reliable source reported that on 22 November 1963, several hours after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Luisa CALDERON Carralero, a Cuban employee of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and believed to be a member of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI), discussed news of the assassination with an acquaintance. Initially, when asked if she had heard the latest news, CALDERON replied, in what appeared to be a joking manner, "Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

2. After further discussion of the news accounts about the assassination, the acquaintance asked CALDERON what else she had learned. CALDERON replied that they (assumed to refer to personnel of the Cuban Embassy) learned about it a little while ago.

JFK EXHIBIT F-518

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Helms, this document was provided to the committee from the CIA and it describes a conversation which raises the possibility that a woman affiliated with DGI, Cuban Intelligence, knew about the assassination before it occurred. In other words, it suggests the possibility of foreknowledge.

I want to be very clear that the committee is not indicating that this definitely does indicate foreknowledge. It simply raises the possibilities of foreknowledge.

Do you recall ever having this conversation brought to your attention?

Mr. HELMS. I really can’t remember. I just don’t have any idea. I imagine it would have been brought to my attention and I imagine
we would have tried to follow up to find out what it meant, but I don’t have a personal recollection of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this particular information was ever communicated to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that it should have been?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought that it would have been one of the things that would have been reported to them, but I don’t have any specific knowledge that it was. This did not show up in the Warren Commission report?

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, Mr. Helms, I am not in a position to answer questions.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I won’t ask you any more questions, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. I appreciate that.

Did the Agency ever conduct an investigation to determine whether Lee Harvey Oswald had been connected with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. Yes, and I believe that Mr. McCone presented to the Warren Commission a sworn affidavit saying that he had no formal connection with the CIA of any kind. I gather that through the years a couple of people have been identified who had once thought that maybe the Agency should have some kind of a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, but to the best of my knowledge no contact was ever made.

In any event, he was not an agent of the CIA and I was horrified this morning to have Mr. Blakey, as a part of this committee’s work coming out with the allegation at this late date that he had some identification with the Agency. Can’t this ever be put to rest? What does it take to put it to rest?

Excuse me, I am asking you a question. I will rephrase it. I would hope that at some juncture someone would find some means of putting this allegation to rest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, what did the Agency’s investigation involve when it was looking into this matter?

Mr. Helms. We have records for one thing in the Agency, and then on top of that, I have the recollection that various people were asked whether they knew anything about Oswald or had any connection with him, people like the officers in the contact division, did you ever interview Lee Harvey Oswald; people in the CE staff, et cetera.

I don’t remember the exact details. Fifteen years later it would be implausible for me to remember exactly what, but I can assure you that we would not have asked or suggested or allowed Mr. McCone to swear out an affidavit, present it to the Warren Commission, unless we believed the affidavit to be truthful.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a written report summarizing the Agency’s investigation?

Mr. Helms. I don’t know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think one should have been filed?

Mr. Helms. I don’t know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Helms. I don’t have any idea why it should have. If it manifested itself in the affidavit sworn by Mr. McCone, isn’t that evidence enough?
Mr. Goldsmith. Are the Agency’s files sufficiently accurate to resolve that issue?

Mr. Helms. I don’t know. You know, after this inquiry today, I am reminded of the fact that back in the days of the Continental Congress that intelligence, espionage, and counterespionage were conducted by committees of the Continental Congress. I think maybe the best thing to do would be to return secret intelligence to the aegis of the U.S. Congress and let you fellows run it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, did the Agency ever have an operational interest in Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask that the witness be shown JFK F-526. I would ask that you read that.

For the record, this is a memorandum dated November 25, 1963.

Mr. Helms. I have glanced at this memorandum. I have not read it in great detail. Who wrote it?

Mr. Goldsmith. You are asking me who wrote it?

Mr. Helms. Oh, I am sorry. I am supposed to take an anonymous memorandum and make judgments on it. I’ll do the best I can.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might add that this is a sanitized document and I would hope you would not want me to indicate who wrote it.

Referring you to the first paragraph that makes reference to the laying on of interviews.

Mr. Helms. The first paragraph makes reference to the laying on of interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the language of this memorandum suggest that the possibility of a contact with Oswald was contemplated?

Mr. Helms. The memorandum does not say anything about a contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the memorandum make reference to the laying on of interviews?

Mr. Helms. It says I had discussed—some time in summer 1960—with almost a whole line blank, the laying on of interviews through blank or other suitable channels. At the moment, I don’t recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his family were on route to this country or was after his arrival.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. I didn’t ask you to read the document. I simply asked you to—

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I didn’t know I was disobeying.

Mr. Goldsmith. I simply asked you whether the document makes reference to the laying on of interviews?

Mr. Helms. Yes, it says someone thought about laying on an interview.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, does it suggest that at the very least a contact with Oswald was contemplated by the Agency?

Mr. Helms. Not by the Agency, by some individual in the Agency. For a lawyer, I think you ought to be more precise.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I am not in a position here today to respond to your criticism.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. That was not criticism.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, have you testified before at a congressional hearing?

Mr. Helms. At any time?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
Mr. HELMS. Do you mean in my life?
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.
Mr. HELMS. On more than one occasion, yes.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. And during those occasions, sir, was the standard operating procedure for the attorney to ask the questions and for the witness to answer them?
Mr. HELMS. I must confess during my life, Mr. Goldsmith, that I was usually asked questions by the Senators or the Congressmen involved.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Very well, Mr. Helms. Under those circumstances again, was the procedure for the member of the committee or its staff to ask the questions and to have the witness answer the questions?
Mr. HELMS. Yes.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did anyone tell you before you came to testify here today that standard operating procedure would not be followed?
Mr. HELMS. I don't recall discussing it with anyone.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Fine. Let's follow the standard operating procedure, Mr. Helms.
Mr. HELMS. Certainly, Mr. Goldsmith.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you know what followup there was to this memorandum dated November 25, 1963?
Mr. HELMS. I have no idea.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would like to draw your attention to the last line on this memorandum. It makes reference to the Harvey story.
Mr. HELMS. Yes.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you know what Harvey story that is referring to?
Mr. HELMS. No, I do not.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency debrief Lee Harvey Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union?
Mr. HELMS. I was not aware that it did. I don't believe it would.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would standard operating procedure have called for Oswald to have been debriefed?
Mr. HELMS. I would not have thought so, Mr. Goldsmith. I think that the standard operating procedure after he returned to the United States would have been for the Navy to debrief him.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Why is that, sir?
Mr. HELMS. Because he had been a member of the Marine Corps, and I believe he stayed in the Marine Reserve, if I am not mistaken. But in any event, the understandings were that military officers were handled by the intelligence organs of the Defense Establishment.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. So I take it, then, that the Agency had no interest in finding out whatever information Oswald may have picked up during his work at a radio factory in Minsk?
Mr. HELMS. I think they would have hoped—they would have got that information from the Navy.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency ever obtain that information from the Navy?
Mr. HELMS. I don't know.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. Again, Mr. Helms, would you agree that a memorandum that makes reference to the possibility of the laying on of interviews on Oswald is contemplating a contact with
Oswald? I am not suggesting a contact necessarily occurred, sir, but that it is contemplating a contact.

Mr. HELMS. Apparently someone, and I am sorry but the memorandum is so sanitized that I don't know who it was nor do I know in what part of the Agency he was, apparently had an idea at some point it might be a good idea to interview Oswald. To the best of my knowledge, his thought never came to anything.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did the Agency ever interview the author of this memorandum to determine whether there was any followup?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I don't know who wrote the memorandum.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you think if there were a written report summarizing what the Agency had done in its investigation of the Oswald allegation, perhaps issues like this might more readily be resolved?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I think these issues are very difficult to resolve, particularly 15 years later when I don't even know what I am dealing with.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you think the availability of a written report summarizing the steps that the Agency went through would facilitate resolving this issue today?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I think probably it would have been, in light of hindsight, might have been very useful if we had had a memorandum for the record of everybody in the Agency who was talked to about Oswald. We should have kept that going for several years.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. If I may have a moment, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HELMS. What is a 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. I believe the 201 file, if memory serves, is simply the number given to a type of file at the Agency in which personality information is placed. In other words, if you open a 201 file on the chairman of this committee, for example, it would simply be information that had come into the Agency which involved that gentleman.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Why would the Agency have opened a 201 file on Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. Why would it have?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELMS. I believe at some point a decision must have been made that Oswald was perhaps a matter of continuing interest and therefore the information which we held on him should be put in the file.

I would like to suggest to the committee that when a Government agency receives mail it has to do something with it, and one of the things that you do with it is to try to categorize the type of information it is and where it would best be filed so that if you need it at some future date you can get it back.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I would ask that Mr. Helms be shown JFK exhibit F-534. For the record, that is a Department of State telegram dated October 31, 1959.

Would you please read to yourself that telegram.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, Mr. Goldsmith, I have read it now.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. This telegram makes reference to Oswald indicating his intention or desire to defect, and it says that Oswald has offered the Soviets any information he has acquired as an enlisted
radar operator. My question to you is whether information contained in this particular telegram would normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I just don't know how to answer the question. I would have thought so but, on the other hand, maybe a decision would be made that this was something that involved the Marine Corps and that this was their concern. After all, the Department of Defense has a very large Defense Intelligence Agency and then it has intelligence units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force and they do have jurisdiction over their people and their security.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I would ask you to refer to your previous testimony to this committee on page 75, specifically to line 15 response to the question posed by me:

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the information contained in this telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

We are referring to the same telegram. Would you please read the response that you gave that day?

Mr. Helms.

Mr. Helms. I would have thought so, an American who was defecting to the Soviet Union would have been of counterintelligence interest and that would have been quite sufficient to have caused the Agency to open a file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, I move for the admission of this exhibit.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, the exhibit is ordered into the record at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibit F-534 was received in evidence:]
FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1304, October 31, 1 P.M.

FOR PO

CITIZENSHIP, APPLIED IN MOSCOW FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP
FOLLOWING ENTRY USSR FROM HELSINKI OCT 15. MOTHER'S
ADDRESS AND HIS LAST ADDRESS US 4336 COLLINWOOD ST.,
FORT WORTH TEXAS. SAYS ACTION CONTEMPLATED LAST TWO
YEARS. MAIN REASON "I AM MARXIST". ATTITUDE ARROGANT
AGGRESSIVE. RECENTLY DISCHARGED MARINE CORPS. SAYS HAS
OFFERED SOVIETS ANY INFORMATION HE HAS ACQUIRED AS
ENSEN IED RADIO OPERATOR.

IN VIEW PETRULI CASE WE PROPOSE DELAY EXECUTING RENUNCIATION
UNTIL SOVIET ACTION KNOWN OR DEPT ADVISES. DESPATCH
FOLLOWS. PRESS INFORMED.

FREERS

JR
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, when, if ever, is it permissible to remove a document from a 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I don't really know what the regulation of the Agency is any more about the removal of documents. I would have thought it was not a common practice to remove documents from a 201 file, but whether there were specific cases under which this might have been done for some particular reason, I suppose there were.

Mr. Goldsmith. When a document is removed from a 201 file, is any record of this event required to be kept?

Mr. Helms. Normally I would think that an entry would be made that such-and-such a document had left the files, so anybody who was reviewing that file would then realize it was not complete. But I am so far away from these matters anymore, Mr. Goldsmith, that I am really not a good witness on these technicalities, and I am sorry about that. But I am not and I would not like the vagueness of my memory to mislead anybody.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask Mr. Helms be shown JFK F-523. I might indicate this is a form that is used to initiate the opening of a 201 file.

Mr. Helms, in whose name was this 201 file opened?

Mr. Helms. The name is Oswald, Lee, and the middle name Henry. Excuse me, I stated December 9, 1960. Is that correct?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Helms. I just wanted to be sure I can read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever initiate inquiry as to why the file on Oswald was opened under the middle name of Henry instead of Harvey?

Mr. Helms. I don't know the answer to that, Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that it caused a great deal of controversy at the time it was discovered after President Kennedy's death. But what the resolution of the matter was and whether any logical explanation was found, I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see a written report dealing with this issue?

Mr. Helms. If there was one I don't recall seeing it, but I have no doubt that somebody must have made an effort to explain it.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to the date of this particular document. It is December 9, 1960. The State Department telegram which we showed you earlier was dated October 31, 1959. That is the document that made reference to Oswald intending to defect and to give military information to the Soviets.

Why after the receipt of this State Department telegram in October of 1959 would it have taken more than a year to open a 201 file on Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I have no explanation for that, Mr. Goldsmith, I am sorry, I just don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a routine name trace for Lee Harvey Oswald have resulted in a reference to the file opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I believe that the procedure in the Agency was when traces were being run of this kind that all the Oswolds would have been run and certainly all the Leo Oswolds would have been run.
It was probably at that time it was discovered there was a mistake here.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it, your answer then, is yes?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice under the section in the middle of the page where it says other identification, the initials AG are inserted. Do you know what the initials AG stand for?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I am not with you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please look down the right-hand side of the page. There is a column marked other identification and within that the initials AG appear. Do you know what that term stands for?

Mr. Helms. I don't know what that is. I am not familiar with it. I am sorry, I just don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. I note by looking at the bottom of the page that Oswald's file was restricted. Do you know why Oswald's file would have been restricted?

Mr. Helms. No, I don't.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that unusual in any way?

Mr. Helms. Maybe because he was an American, but I don't literally know the reason.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it unusual to restrict such files?

Mr. Helms. I wouldn't have thought so. But the Agency was loaded with different kinds of classifications and classification procedures and special arrangements, and so forth, to take care of unusual circumstances, so I don't think that was unusual.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are 201 files ever maintained on a covert basis or is there ever such a thing as a fake 201 file?

Mr. Helms. I don't know. You brought to my attention the fact that you had discovered one in the Agency. I was not aware of the phenomenon myself prior to your having brought it to my attention. Since you did find one, then I concede that I guess there was such a thing, but I was not aware of the one that you brought to my attention and I am not aware of any others.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's examine that particular one at this point. I would ask that Mr. Helms be given JFK F-522.

What was the ZR rifle project?

Mr. Helms. My understanding from the hearings of the Church committee, I believe the ZR rifle originally started out as an indicator for a project which was supposed to cover a man who in turn had been taken on to have available an operational capability to kill people. This man was hired before I was aware of these things. I have this in hindsight but I believe that is what the ZR rifle was supposed to be and then I believe later it metamorphosed into something else. But anyway, after I became Deputy Director for Plans, I put on the shelf for good and all use of his capacity for killing people. We didn't need that, so that was the end of that.

If the ZR rifle continued after that, it was in another context and I don't remember precisely what the context was. I can read what you have given me here, that it was to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. My recollection of Division D was that it was the operational staff in the Agency which attempted to procure code and cipher materials overseas for use by the National Security Agency.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. In fact, that form which you were just reading, the reference to Division D, has no bearing at all upon any executive action-type problem, any type of assassination program?

Mr. HELMS. I would not have thought so. If that was in Division D, maybe it was there for convenience. Maybe they didn’t know where else to put it, and I can’t blame them.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Is it also possible the person writing these notes was writing that aspect of it to mislead people to cover the fact that this was assassination activity?

Mr. HELMS. I don’t know whether that was the idea or not, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Let’s take a closer look at this particular document. This document consists of handwritten notes. The notes are in the handwriting of two different individuals.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, I notice here on one of the pages, “It should have a phony 201 to backstop this.”

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You are reading from which page, sir?

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, they are not numbered, Mr. Goldsmith. I am not trying to be difficult. It is 1, 2, 3—this is page 4.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. You are referring to the bottom of the page where it says, “should have phony 201 in RI”?

Mr. HELMS. That is it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. The document indicates, “should have phony 201 in RI to backstop this. All documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like”—I believe that says a “CE file.”

Mr. HELMS. I think that must be what it means.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Let’s refer your attention now to page 6, two pages further.

Mr. HELMS. Right.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At the bottom right-hand portion of the page approximately five or six lines up, the person wrote in, “Never mention the word assassination.” Is that true?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, that is what it says.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Would you turn to the next page. Does that page say “No projects or papers except for cover”? Does it also say “cover file create from RIS”—the rest of it not really legible? Does it contain that language?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I don’t know, I can’t read it either. It is so cut up and excised, and so forth, it really doesn’t make much sense.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In any event, Mr. Helms, do these handwritten notes contain any indication that this particular project contemplated the use of fake files?

Mr. HELMS. That is what it says here. I don’t know any more about it than that, if this is the item I mentioned a moment ago that you had brought to my attention and I concede that is what this says. But I find it awfully difficult to deal with these matters so totally out of context and excised and sanitized, and so forth. My recollection is as I have told you, that the ZR rifle project was an individual who was supposed to kill people. He never killed anybody and he was never used for that purpose after I had anything to do with it, and any further business the ZR rifle was involved in was something else’s entirely.
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I would ask you to refer to page 86 of your prior testimony which is given at a time when you had access to the complete document.

Mr. Helms. Is the top of that page supposed to have been censored by the Agency or is that somebody else's lining?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, sir, that was not intended to be sanitized by the Agency. I believe your lawyer will confirm that.

Mr. Helms. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith, I was confused by what I was looking at here.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question to you:

Will you please read your answer?

Mr. Helms [reading]:

Mr. Helms. Yes, it looks like that. But then his boss would have known about this. He would have had to get permission to do that. Somebody would have known about it.

Is that as far as you want me to read?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I have one more exhibit to show you, Mr. Helms. I would ask Mr. Helms be given JFK F-524.

While that is being done, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that JFK F-522, F-524, and F-526 be entered into the record.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, the exhibits are entered into the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. In addition, I would ask that JFK F-525, F-512, and F-523 also be entered into the record.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, the exhibits are entered into the record at this point.

[Whereupon, JFK exhibits F-512, F-522, F-523, F-524, and F-526 were received in evidence:]
JOSEPH H. LANGOSCH, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, being duly sworn, makes oath as follows:

That this statement is made freely, voluntarily, and without threats, promises, assurances, or remuneration from any source.

That from January 5, 1955 until approximately August 1968 I was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

That during 1963 I functioned in two capacities as a CIA officer, the first capacity being as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff and the second capacity being as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff.

That during 1963 the Special Affairs Staff was the CIA staff responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services.

That as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, I was responsible for safeguarding the Special Affairs Staff against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services.

That I was further responsible as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff for initiating and supervising counterintelligence operations designed to penetrate the Cuban Intelligence Services.
That during the latter half of April 1964, in my capacity as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, I became acquainted with an intelligence officer of the Cuban Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI).

That the Cuban intelligence officer with whom I became acquainted had defected from the DGI while in Canada and subsequently entered the United States and maintained an operational relationship with the CIA under the cryptonym

That after his defection, provided the CIA with certain DGI documents and that none of these documents concerned or referred to either the assassination of President Kennedy or Lee Harvey Oswald.

That during May 1964 reported information to me concerning the reaction of the DGI in Havana, Cuba to the assassination of President Kennedy and that this information is recorded in a memorandum dated May 8, 1964 which I prepared for the Chief of CIA's Counterintelligence Staff and that this memorandum accurately reflects the information reported to me by

That the above-referenced memorandum of May 8, 1964's information states that Luisa Calderon Carralero, also known as Luisa Rodriguez Calderon, was being paid a salary by the DGI, that she might have had contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, that during the time she was in Mexico the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar, that
after the DGI's interception of the letter she had been followed by the DGI and seen in the company of an American and that a DGI officer in Havana, Cuba named Roberto Hernandez de Curbelo believed that Luisa Calderon Carralero had been recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency.

That I do not recall ever reviewing a CIA report or being informed about a conversation which transpired on November 22, 1963, approximately three hours after the assassination of President Kennedy, in which Luisa Calderon Carralero may have expressed foreknowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy.

That during 1965 I prepared a memorandum for the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division for Cuba, entitled 'Allegations,' which concerned security problems with the AMLASH operation.

That I prepared the following statement at page 3, paragraph 3A(3) of the memorandum entitled Allegations: "Assassination, obviously, is a dangerous game, not merely to the plotters in a physical sense, but to a sponsoring government which may suffer severe political repercussions at home and abroad if its involvement is made known." That the government referred to herein is the Government of the United States and that the plotters referred to herein were persons connected with the AMLASH operation.

That the AMLASH operation was initiated and supported by the CIA.
That when I prepared the memorandum entitled 'Allegations,' the AMLASH operation had been an insecure operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963.

That the AMLASH operation had been an insecure operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy because it was highly probable that as of 1962 the Cuban Intelligence Services had knowledge of the CIA's association with persons involved in the AMLASH operation, including AMLASH-1, also known as

That the insecure nature of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was known to senior level CIA officials, including Desmond Fitzgerald.

That the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officials as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA.

I understand that this affidavit may be introduced and received into evidence by the Select Committee on Assassinations of the United States House of Representatives, and may lead them to make various findings of fact, and the statutes applicable to Congressional investigations, including but not limited to those concerning false statements, obstruction, or misleading, would subject me to criminal penalties for not telling the whole and complete truth in this affidavit.
Further affiant saith not.

Swore and subscribed to before me
on this 14th day of September, 1978.

[Signature]

NOTARY PUBLIC
ROBERT F. MITCHELL, JR.
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires March 31, 1982

My Commission Expires:
1. Objectives: The objectives of this project are the procurement and maintenance of code and cipher materials in accordance with requirements issued by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, any listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be executed on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division 3 with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1962 began the expansion of agent estates as a developmental activity. During the same period...
period requirements from NASA became more refined and in
many respects more sensitive. Because most stations were
not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because
of the desirability of completely centralized control over this
effort, it was determined that Division D, which is
in close touch with NASA or procurement representatives, could
best conduct the activity. The direct spotting activity
has now advanced far enough to justify removing from
the 196 category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: E.J. WIN is underwritten
contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of
spotting agent candidates.

For
a period of a year and a half, the area contacted was
specifically by CSSborough, in behalf of the
U.S. Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect
an excellent performance by E. J. WIN. In October 1968

35 379 0689
1) Legal, ethical, moral, operational, problems, political; non-attirbute-
ability.

2) Our own experience (Bangoke) (effect on D.C.) and experience
w/ K.B. (Crocker, Ramlem, Stringer, Holders) require most
professional, proven operationally competent, military, stable,
experienced, etc. officers (four available), able to conduct post-
search + submit to full check if needed or knowledge, training
is enough high regard for operational security,
be able, recommendations are all important.

3) Maximum security.
5. Guer planning should include provision for
Planning for forearm caches in case of

9. Should have phone 201 in R1 to backstop this. All
comments therein for an updated should look like
a CE file.

35 379 0691
Legal, operational & ethical morale problems Khrushchev case.

Higher not mere enough.

1) Maximum security + within CIA only (e.g., how much does Khrushchev now know?)

Limitation on number of

Agents for encrypting & deciphering device of enemy objectives
Set 7 - 25/1 - "The Magic Button"
- Narcotics Rifles
- "for a bump" - RIS 201 Cover
- Contour - Bankruptcy - ko. St. eyes - Jan. A.
- Not & TSE Problem / Contradict - from 0-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort a
- Confrontation of winners.
- El. Benford - Accumulation
  - Example 3 "Your"

FRANCOI 7.5/6 - Joli. F

"Translating machines" - LE
- Basic Numbers Project
- Phenomena - (v. 4/12/6)

Cassius - Keep

Anesthesia

26/1 AS - Paymen 301 - Matter
- No Fill Reserve - press next button
- mud reserves

1. Select proper pump to run
2. Place a cover
3. Secure Rules
4. Fuel Levels
5. Fast Restart - Brake - $123456 - later
1. No projects or posters except for cones.

12. Come into direct from R15 or elsewhere - consign.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William K. Harvey

SUBJECT: Extension of Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 19 February 1962, same subject

1. For the purpose of ZRRIFLE activities, you are hereby authorized to retain the services of principal agent QJWIN and such other principal agents and sub-agents as may be required. This authorization will continue to be in force through 31 December 1963 subject to renewal at that time.

2. As established by contract with him, QJWIN's salary will be $7,200 per annum. Accounting for the expenses of QJWIN and other agents involved in this activity will be in the form of receipts for funds received by them, and these receipts will be retained in the ZRRIFLE covert operational file. Because of the sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category and by certification. In addition to the salary established for QJWIN, you are authorized the expenditure of $13,800 through 31 December 1963. If further funds are necessary, they will be provided.

3. This memorandum approves an amendment of reference memorandum increasing funds authorized for the previous period from $14,700 to $16,200.

4. This memorandum is to be considered in lieu of project and constitutes authorization for all travel, per diem, operational, and other expenses.

5. It is requested that this activity be handled strictly on an EYES ONLY basis.

RICHARD HELMS
Deputy Director (Plans)
MEMORANDUM FOR: William K. Harvey

SUBJECT: Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities

1. For the purpose of ZRRIFLE activities, you are hereby authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN and such other principal agents and sub-agents as may be required. This authorization will continue to be in force through 31 December 1962, subject to renewal at that time.

2. As established by contract with him, QJWIN's salary will be $7,200 per annum. Accounting for the expenses of QJWIN and other agents involved in this activity will be in the form of receipts for funds received by them, and these receipts will be retained in the ZRRIFLE covert operational file. Because of the sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category and by your certification. In addition to the salary established for QJWIN, you are authorized the expenditure of $7,500 through 31 December 1962. If further funds are necessary, they will be provided.

3. This memorandum is to be considered in lieu of project and constitutes authorization for all travel, per diem, operational and other expenses.

4. It is requested that this activity be handled strictly on an EYES ONLY basis.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
To: HEADQUARTERS
From: JFK EXHIBIT F-523

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in black letters.

SECTION 1: All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write 'UNKNOWN' for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION III

NAME: Oswald, Lee
SEX: M
AGE: 20
DATE OF BIRTH: 11/18/1939
CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH: New Orleans, LA
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: USA
CITY OR TOWN OF RESIDENCE: Havana, Cuba
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE: USSR

OCCUPATION/POSITION: Roller operator, U.S. Marine Corp

NOTE: Travel to the USSR in October 1959.

Document Number: J-1

Date: 1959

Record Copy: R312

JFK Exhibit F-523
Mr. G. Robert Blakey  
Chief Counsel & Director  
House Select Committee on Assassinations  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Blakey:

Forwarded herewith is an unsigned memorandum dated 20 February 1964 concerning a machine listing of documents for the Oswald 201 file. This document was not released earlier under FOIA, but has been declassified in the light of new considerations. It formerly bore the classification of Secret and the handling restriction of Eyes Only.

Mr. Goldsmith requested this statement for use of the document in the public hearings, as the classification and handling restriction had been removed when the document was approved for release under FOIA.

Very truly yours,

S.D. Breckinridge  
Principal Coordinator, HSCA

encl.

JFK Exhibit F-524
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

SUBJECT: Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File

1. A machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in OSWALD's 201 file was requested and is attached. The actual machine work of this type was begun in 1963, but a few items of previous dates were also recorded.

2. A comparison of the documents physically available in the 201 file and those recorded as being in the 201 file has shown that 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available in it. This total is made up of:

   2 dispatches
   7 memoranda from the FBI
   1 CSCI
   2 State Department documents
   25 cales.

3. Machine inquiries for the location of these documents have not been made.
For the record we forward herewith a memorandum by

in which he gives his recollections of interest in Subject following Osmin

Subject's return to the United States from the US.

Encl.

Distribution


3

Document Number 435-173A

for FOIA Review on May 1976

17 Dec 1965
SUBJECT: Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald

TO:

1. It makes little difference now, but I had at one time an interest in Oswald. As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled that as I had discussed -- sometime in Summer 1960 -- with the laying on of interview(s) through or other suitable channels. At the moment I don't recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his family were en route to our country of if it was after their arrival.

2. I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the USSR had struck me from the moment I had read the first STAM Dispatch on him, and I told my subordinates something amounting to "Don't push too hard to get the information we need, because this individual looks odd." We were particularly interested in the what Oswald might provide on the Minsk factory in which he had been employed, on certain sections of the city itself, and of course we sought the usual that might help develop a biographic information.

3. I was phasing into my cover assignment at the time. Thus, I would have left our country shortly after Oswald's arrival. I do not know what action developed thereafter.

Addendum

4. As an afterthought, I recall also that at the time I was becoming increasingly interested in watching develop a pattern that we had discovered in the course of our bio and research work: the number of Soviet women marrying foreigners, being permitted to leave the USSR, then eventually divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without returning "home". The case was among the first of these, and we eventually turned up something like two dozen similar cases, because interested in the developing trend we had come across. It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald's wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in Oswald's own experiences in the USSR, that we showed intelligence interest in the Harvey story.
Mr. GOLDSMITH. The first page of JFK exhibit F-524 is a letter from Mr. Breckinridge to Professor Blakey of this committee. I would refer your attention—why don’t you read both pages.

Mr. HELMS. I have had a chance to read not only Mr. Breckenridge’s covering memorandum to Mr. Blakey but also the attached memorandum which is unsigned and just says “To Chief,” I don’t know what.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Does this memorandum make reference to 37 documents being missing from Oswald’s 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, it does. It says that:

In 1964, February 20, a comparison of the documents available in 201 file and those recorded as being those in the 201 file has shown 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available in it.

And there is a breakdown of what seems to be missing.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was this document ever brought to your attention?

Mr. HELMS. I can never remember it having been brought to my attention.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Were you ever informed that at some time there were at least 37 documents missing from Oswald’s 201 file?

Mr. HELMS. No; I doubt that would have been brought to my attention. I would assume somebody in charge of the registry would have gone looking for the documents.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Is the information contained in this document particularly sensitive?

Mr. HELMS. You mean sensitive operationally or in a security sense?

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Sensitive in the sense that the Agency normally attributes to that term.

Mr. HELMS. I wouldn’t have thought so.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. In light of that, why would this document have carried the classification of “secret” and the restriction “for eyes only” prior to its declassification?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I am sorry but I don’t see “eyes only” on it nor do I see “secret” on it.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. I understand that. I said prior to its declassification.

Please reread the letter to Professor Blakey from Mr. Breckenridge.

Mr. HELMS. I don’t know. Maybe it was overclassified. A lot of documents in the agency were.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Helms. I have no further questions.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other exhibits which relate generally to the subjects of Mr. Helms’ testimony, but with respect to which there was not sufficient time to ask specific questions. They have been marked for identification as JFK F-513 through F-517, F-519, F-521, F-525, F-528, F-530, and F-533. May they be admitted into evidence at this time?

Mr. FREYER. Without objection, they may be admitted into evidence.

[The exhibits referred to above follow.]
 TO DIRECTOR  
FROM:  
ACTION:  
INFO:  

XX

DIR CITE:  

SOURCE ON:
1. ACCID  1 OCT 63, AMERICAN MALE  
   NAME: OSWALD  
   SEEN WHEN SPOKE WITH CONSUL WHOM HE BELIEVED TO BE ALBRECHT VLADIMIROVICH  
   VITOPIA, SUBJ ASKED SOV GUARD IVAN GROZDNOY, IF THERE  
   ANYTHING NEW, RE TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON.  
   NOTHING RECEIVED YET, BUT REQUEST HAD BEEN SENT.  
2. NAME PHOTOS MALE APPEARS AMERICAN  
   APPEARENT AGE 35, ATHLETIC BUILD,  
   CIRCA 6 FEET, RECEDING HAIRLINE, BLEADING TOP, MORE KHAKIS  
   AND SPORT SKIRT.  
3. NO LOCAL DISSEY.  

15 Oct.

Request photo of Oswald  

6-12

Document Number 6-12  
for FOIA Review on 19 Jan 1975

JFK Exhibit F-513
MEMORANDUM

March 26, 1964

SUBJECT: Mexico - CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee Harvey Oswald on March 24, 1964

The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us additional information we requested.

We would like to know just when we got the information with respect to Lee Harvey Oswald and what was the information and how was it obtained. How did the information get from Mexico to the CIA in Washington, and in what form did it come?

At what point was the information that the Lee Harvey Oswald was probably the Lee Harvey Oswald who had defected and was married to a Russian developed so that when the telegram went from the CIA in Washington to the various agencies it contained such information. In other words, I would like to know whether this was information available in
Mexico or did this additional information get in the message only after it reached Washington and the information was being disseminated to the various agencies.

As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry.

We should also determine why the Navy never furnished the CIA with copies of the most recent photographs of Oswald.
We have a problem here for your determination.

This is responsive to paragraph 3 of Rankin's letter (see reference tab). JA does not desire to respond directly to paragraph 2 of that letter which made a levy for our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since 23 November. We found that, except for three telegrams, all that the Secret Service had was material we had sent to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. Apparently, he had simply passed it to the Secret Service as a matter of internal information.

Unless you feel otherwise, (*) would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2. If they come back on the point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the materials rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies, or the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which were not of Oswald, and the passenger manifest on an airline which also did not pertain to Oswald.

If you desire to take note of the levy in paragraph 2, we would recommend that you indicate in the attached proposed memorandum solely that we will take care of it separately.
JFK Exhibit F-516

1. LED OSMOND
   1. TOO PROBABLY IDENTICAL
   LER ROBERT OSWALD
   BORN 18 OCT 1956, NEW ORLEANS,
   LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES.
   2. NELLED TO USSR. 21 OCT 1982. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TALL.
   3. WEIGHT ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT-BROWN HAIR, EYES.

BLUE EYES...

1. ON 27 OCT 1982, OSWALD ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE HIS UNITED
   STATES CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES DIP IN MOSCOW.
   2. HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP ON 13 OCT
   1982.
   3. POSTMARKED MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD
   ON FIVE DAYS. 1981, IN WHICH SURI INDICATED
   DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US DSP, AS WISER TO RETURN TO USA
   IN "WE COULD END TO ENGAGE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING
   OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST US." ON 3 JULY ON HIS OWN
   INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE END WITH HIS WIFE TO SERVE ABOUT
   HIS RETURN TO STATES. SURI STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER
   APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP, AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT
   (CONTINUED)
That time had been to remain in USSR and for temporary extension of his tourist visa pending outcome of his request. This application, according to Oswald, contained no key to Soviet citizenship. Oswald stated that had been exploited since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian Radio and TV Factory in Minsk where worked as metal worker in research section. Oswald was married on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolayeva Pusakova, a dental technician born 17 July 1941 USSR. No EDQS traces. He attempted arrange for wife to join him in Moscow so she could appear at embassy for visa interview. His American PEP was returned to him. US MBS Moscow stated thirty months of realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing effect on Oswald.

2. Latest EDQS into HAC REMPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYS had determined Oswald is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have been permitted and Dept state had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

(Continued)
HQs advised on any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *According to 1 Oct, an American male name Leo Oswald (phonetic) stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local dissemination had been made.
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963, MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, IDENTIFIED AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A "BEATING" BAILLITE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN-BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUZAEVA, AND THEIR

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATED TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

INFO BASKET ON (IN 36317)
Subject: General
Specific: OSWALD CASE

THE SOURCE DOES NOT HAVE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD OR HIS ACTIVITIES BUT WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE ITEMS OF INTEREST ON CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL DE INTELECTA.

THE INFORMATION APPEARED BELOW WAS FURNISHED BY THE SOURCE AND IS KEPT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

1. Prior to October 1963, OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELECTA (DGI), specifically with Luisa CALDERON, Namal VEGA PEREZA and Rosalia RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

VELA whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is PARDO is the current Cuban I3 chief in Mexico. He recently had a tour of duty in Habana, prior to which he held the same post as now as Cuban I3 chief in Mexico.

RODRIGUEZ is a Cuban I3 staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eduardo, Casimiro and Jose Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERON to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964.

COMMENT: has the following references concerning Luisa CALDERON Casarrubio: She was assigned to the commercial office of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and she had arrived in Mexico on 16 January 1963 and on 11 December 1963 made a reservation to return to Cuba on Cuban Airlines / She left Mexico City for Havana on 15 December 1963 using passport 2/63/T

Another reference / said that her date of arrival in Mexico was 19 January 1963 and that she had replaced Rocio VINTZ, a Mexican secretary in the commercial office. Other references apparently concerning the subject are which do not appear to add any interest to that given above.

2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSWALD in any agent capacity or other manner.

3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, it caused much concern concerning the fact OSWALD had been in the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and field officers of the DII to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "Top Secret" (very secret), "Secret" (secret), and "Important" (important). The material once packaged was to be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DII officers and all DII pouches were suspended temporarily.

2. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached the DII, there was no immediate comment but, when Fidal CASTRO spoke on television to deny Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VALL, who has been mentioned previously, was in Cuba and connected to a group of DII staff officers that OSWALD had come to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VALL did not give any details and the subject was not pursued.

4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service.

5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

6. The only Holla who is recalled is "The Hook", the Cuban who was convicted in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between two Cuban groups. The DII staff officer who had been in the United Nations in New York, SANTILLAN traveled to Cuba with "The Hook" and with another Cuban named CRIBELA and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance.

7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services is not known.

8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President Kennedy's assassination.

9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidal CASTRO previously mentioned.

10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBERSTEIN aka Jack RIFF.

11. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about him other than what appeared in the press.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November 1963? If so which service?

2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963?

3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?

4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?

5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play For Cuba Committee?

6. Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?

7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination?

8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?

9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or others and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case?

10. Was Jack RUBY a known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way?

11. Does subject know a who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Nuevo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceeded to Havana by special plane. He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual.

12. ____________________________
1. On 15 May 1964, we provided the President's Commission with a summary of our debriefing of Cuban defector [who had no personal knowledge of Oswald and no information linking him to the Cuban intelligence services in any manner. As a follow-up, Mr. Howard P. Willens of the Commission asked if he could see the questions used in the interrogation.

2. On 18 June, I took the questions and source's responses to the Commission and showed them to Mr. Willens. He studied them and returned the questions to me with the observation that they were very thorough and fully satisfied his requirements. He said that he saw no need to pursue this angle any further. The questions and answers exhibited to Mr. Willens are attached. At no time during our contacts with the Commission did we disclose the source's identity.

3. Mr. Willens indicated that the Commission was winding up its investigation. He was highly complimentary of CIA, referring to the agency personnel he encountered here and in Mexico as "real professionals." Mr. Willens asked that I convey his best regards to you.

Document Number 739-319
for FOIA Review 319 JUN 1976

Attachment: a/s

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SOURCE EVALUATION:

The Source is believed to be very reliable. We have established through independent evidence and cross-checking that the major part of the intelligence information furnished by him is unquestionably true. For example, we knew independent of this Source that Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez were Cuban intelligence officers in Mexico.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debriefing of Cuban Source dated 5 May 1964

1. The source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.

   A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

   B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source’s information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DGI, specifically Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogello RODRIGUEZ Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-63 and 11-22-63.

   A) What does source mean by contact?

   B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

   C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?

   D) What was the purpose of these contacts?

   E) Did Oswald not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what pretenses, if any, were employed in contacting him?

   F) Did source ever see any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?
G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camera equipment to cover these contacts?

H) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.

3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?

4. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?

5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.

Addendum 18 June with reference to #5:

The only possible fabrication known by source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO on a TV program of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.
Subject - General: Debriefing of Cuban Source
Specific: OSWALD Case

5 May 1964

The source does not have direct knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based on Cuban intelligence officers assigned to the Dirección General De Inteligencia. The information appearing below was furnished by the source and is keyed to questions submitted.

1. Prior to October 1963, OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the Dirección General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa CALDERÓN, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

VEGA, whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is MARCOS, is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently had a tour of duty in Habana, prior to which he held the same post as now as Cuban IS chief in Mexico.

RODRIGUEZ is a Cuban IS staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eduardo, Casimiro and José Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERÓN to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964.

2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSWALD in any agent capacity or other manner.

3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, it caused much comment concerning the fact OSWALD had been in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and field officers of the DGI to sort and package all documents according to whether they
were "Muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), and "importante" (important). The material once packaged was to be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DGI officers and all DGI pouches were suspended temporarily.

B. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached the DGI, there was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CASTRO spoke on television to deny Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VEGA, who has been mentioned previously, was in Cuba and commented to a group of DGI staff officers that OSWALD had come to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VEGA did not give any details and the subject was not pursued.

4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service.

5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

6. The only Molina who is recalled is "The Hook", the Cuban who was convicted in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between two Cuban groups. The DGI staff officer who had been in the United Nations in New York, SANTIESTABAN traveled to Cuba with "The Hook" and with another Cuban named ORIHUELA and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance.

7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services is not known.

8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President Kennedy's assassination.

9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned.

10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY.

12. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about him other than what appeared in the press.
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2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963?

3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?

4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?

5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

6. Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?

7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination?

8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?

9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or others and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case?

10. Was Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way?

11. Does subject know who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Nuevo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceeded to Havana by special plane. He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual.

12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD.
Today, Friday, March 27, 1964, I met at CIA headquarters with Mr. Rocca to review the CIA file on Lee Harvey Oswald. The file contains those materials furnished to us previously by CIA. In addition, it contains the following materials:

a. Cable reports from the CIA station in Mexico of November 22 and 23, 1963 relating to photographs of a person who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October and November 1963; and reports on these cables furnished on November 23 by CIA to the Secret Service. These messages are accurately paraphrased in the attachments to the CIA memorandum of March 24, 1964 (Commission Document 574).

b. Cable of October 10 from CIA Mexico City station to CIA headquarters reporting on Oswald contact at Soviet Embassy, and October 10, 1963 message from CIA headquarters to Mexico City station of background information on Oswald. These messages are accurately reported in the CIA memorandum of January 31, 1964.

I did not review any materials later than November 23, 1963.

Mr. Rocca also showed me the "printout" of the references to Oswald documents in the CIA electronic data storage system. There was no item listed which we have not been given either in full text or paraphrased.

When I evidenced an interest in the CIA electronic data processing system, Mr. Rocca said that he would arrange a detailed explanation at a future visit.

JFK Exhibit F-525
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. | called me in at 0900 and showed me in draft a memorandum recording his conversation with Allen Dulles on Saturday 11 April re CIA assistance to the Warren Commission. In essence, the conversation dealt with questions which the Warren Commission will direct to CIA. Copy follows?

2. | has suggested that nothing further be done re preparation of an analysis of the Oswald affair pending receipt of the questions from the Commission. Answering these questions might make it unnecessary to prepare an analysis.

3. | asked that we prepare, on a priority basis, a reply to the FBI communication containing two reports on the Oswald case from Xosken. [ ] is handling. [ ] and [ ] are to see it in draft.

P.S. | also returned to me the several items of Oswald production borrowed on 11 April.

Document Number 657-83

for FCIA Review 93 JUN 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Discussions with Mr. Allen W. Dulles on the Oswald Case on 11 April

1. At the instructions of the DDP, I visited Mr. Dulles on 11 April to discuss with him certain questions which Mr. Dulles feels the Warren Commission may pose to CIA. Mr. Dulles explained that while the Commission wished to clarify certain aspects of the Oswald case in which a response from CIA seemed necessary, it was not sure how these questions should be posed nor how CIA should respond. Mr. Dulles hoped that our discussions would enable him to advise the Commission on this matter. He first raised the allegation that Oswald was a CIA agent. He mentioned two sources for this accusation. One was Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald’s mother, and the other was Mr. Mark Lane, Mrs. Oswald’s attorney. He suggested that the Commission, in asking us this question, might well forward a summary of pertinent excerpts of the testimony concerning this matter. He noted, however, that Mrs. Oswald’s testimony was so incoherent that it would be difficult to find pertinent excerpts, thus it would be better for the Commission to summarize the testimony.

2. Mr. Dulles then suggested that the response to this question could be in the form of sworn testimony before the Commission by a senior CIA official or a letter or affidavit. He recalled that the Director of the FBI had replied by letter to a similar question. In any event, Mr. Dulles felt the reply should be straightforward and to the point. He thought language which made it clear that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an employee or agent of CIA would suffice. We should also state that neither CIA nor any agency acting on CIA’s behalf was ever in contact or communication with Oswald. Mr. Dulles did not think it would be a good idea to cite CIA procedures for agent assessment and handling to show that it would have been unlikely for Oswald to have been chosen as a CIA agent to enter Russia. There are always exceptions to every rule and this might be misunderstood by members of the Commission with little background in activity of this sort. I agreed with him that a carefully phrased denial of the charges of involvement with Oswald seemed most appropriate.
3. The next question concerned the possibility of Oswald's having been a Soviet agent. Mr. Dulles suggested that the Commission's question on this matter be phrased somewhat as follows: "In the knowledge or judgment of CIA was Lee Harvey Oswald an agent of the Soviet intelligence services or the intelligence services of other communist states at any time prior to 22 November 1963, or was Oswald solicited by these intelligence services to become such an agent?" After considering this question, it became apparent that the problem of making a "judgment" as to whether Oswald might have become an agent of a communist power was subject to the same difficulties we would have encountered if we had tried to answer the allegation of CIA affiliated by citing CIA's own procedures. If CIA, in response to the "judgment" portion of the question, were to say that in light of its knowledge of Soviet Bloc procedures it was unlikely that Oswald would have become their agent, we would have to admit that exceptions are always possible. Mr. Dulles and I felt that it would be better to avoid this and confine our response to a precise statement of fact. This statement, in Mr. Dulles' view, could note that CIA possessed no knowledge either gained independently or from its study of the materials supplied by the Commission tending to show that Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent of the Soviet intelligence services, or the services of any other Communist country, or for that matter of any other country.

4. Both questions were discussed individually but later Mr. Dulles suggested that because they were inter-connected it would be better if the Commission posed them in one letter to CIA. I agreed that this might be simpler.

5. After covering these questions of direct interest to CIA, Mr. Dulles mentioned other issues which concerned the Commission. He remarked that members of the Commission could not understand why CIA had not begun an investigation of Oswald as soon as it received word that he had defected. I noted that this question had been discussed with Mr. Rankin and his staff and there seemed to be considerable understanding of the practical circumstances which made it impossible for CIA to undertake such investigation inside the USSR. I expressed the hope that it would not be necessary for CIA to place matters of this sort in the public record. Mr. Dulles agreed.
6. Mr. Dulles then asked if it were normal for the Soviet Government to permit a Soviet woman to marry a foreigner and then allow her to leave with her husband shortly after the marriage. This question perturbed the Commission and they would like to have an answer. I said that whereas the response could have some bearing on whether Oswald was an agent, the problem seemed to lie more in the consular field and I suggested that the best way to obtain an opinion on what constituted "normal practice" in marriage cases in the USSR would be to question the Department of State. Mr. Dulles agreed with this.

7. Mr. Dulles expressed his appreciation for the assistance accorded him and said that he would discuss the framing of the questions for CIA with Mr. Rankin on Monday, 13 April. At this point I did offer a personal opinion in regard to the way in which CIA should respond. Noting that testimony on questions such as these would be difficult to insert in the public record, I suggested that it would be best if the CIA response were in written form. However, much will depend on the form in which the questions are eventually put to us and I imagine that a final decision can be made at that time.

8. At no time during these discussions did Mr. Dulles make any inquiries about Nosenko and I volunteered no information on this score.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Use of NOSENKO Information in Warren Commission Report

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Mr. J. Lee Rankin, and Mr. David Slawson of the Warren Commission; Mr. Richard Helms, C/SR and C/SR/CI of CIA

DATE: 27 July 1964

PLACE: Offices of the Warren Commission

1. This discussion, following earlier ones on the same subject, was called by Mr. Rankin to discuss proposed drafts for inclusion or non-inclusion of NOSENKO's information in the report of the Commission. Mr. Slawson had prepared a short memorandum with three attachments, offering alternative drafts. A copy of Mr. Slawson's memo, which was an informal one and not for permanent Commission records, is attached.

2. Of these drafts, one (#2) named NOSENKO, admits he had direct knowledge of Oswald's case in the USSR and comments that his reliability is uncertain. Another (#3, parts 1 and 2) includes information from NOSENKO about Oswald which would be included in the report; NOSENKO is not named as the source. A third draft (#4) is for inclusion in the Commission report if no NOSENKO information is used, explaining why certain information was not included in order to protect the Commission from later charges of having failed to use NOSENKO's information.
3. The CIA representatives thought that it would be undesirable to include any NOSENKO information in the report, and after some discussion, there was general agreement on this view. The circumstances which contributed to this conclusion are summarized here:

a. NOSENKO is a KGB plant and may be publicly exposed as such some time after the appearance of the Commission's report. CIA cannot at this time, however, evaluate the accuracy of what NOSENKO has reported on the Oswald case, nor the significance of his having reported it.

b. Even without public discrediting of the source, specific aspects of NOSENKO's information are likely to lead to questions and doubts on the part of perceptive readers.

c. Once NOSENKO is exposed as a KGB plant, there will arise the danger that his information will be mirror-read by the press and public, leading to conclusions that the USSR did direct the assassination.

d. The Agency's greatest contribution to the resolution of the questions at hand would be to break NOSENKO and get the full story of how and why he was told to tell the story he did about Oswald. While we have no certainty that we can ever do this, if we are to succeed we need time and must in the meantime avoid creating pressures which might force us to release NOSENKO to the public domain. (There, articulate and plausible, he would unquestionably be able to establish himself beyond hope of dislodging, since his story cannot easily be pierced even by trained specialists, much less by private citizens however intelligent.) The release of the fact that NOSENKO knew specifically about the Oswald case would, of course, create such pressure, and no hedging on source description could protect his identity.

4. The Commission representatives, particularly Mr. Rankin, felt that some mention of NOSENKO might be inevitable, at least when after the publication of its report,
the press would ask the Commission about him and whether he had had anything to contribute. Mr. Helms suggested that CIA could provide a number of Soviet intelligence defectors to testify to the Commission, and the Commission could then report that "defectors," in general, and without naming NOSENKO, had given information. It was agreed that the Agency had already provided such defector information in its previous reports, and that wording to this effect could be worked into the Commission's Draft #4, which was otherwise quite suitable from the point of view of the Agency and the Commission. At Mr. Helms' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA would undertake to draft a few sentences to this effect.

(Note: The proposed redraft of the Commission's draft #4, consisting only of the addition of one sentence after the opening sentence, is also attached to this memorandum.)

5. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Rankin said that the Commission's report would be published in mid-September, rather than 8 August as estimated earlier.

6. Mr. Dulles reported that a correspondent, had told him that a senior official of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, perhaps the Minister Counselor, had told him two or three weeks ago that Nadezhda Furtseva, then a member of the Presidium of the CC/CPSU, had interceded on Oswald's behalf after the latter had been rejected by another Soviet agency, and as "Minister of Propaganda" had supported him because the Soviets did not want the adverse publicity -- and hampering of future defections -- which would accompany any refusal to accept him in the USSR.

(Note: This story checks with part of NOSENKO's, and like NOSENKO's story, is supported by an entry in Oswald's "Historical Diary" to the effect that after his suicide attempt Oswald was handled by an entirely different set of people.)
7. Chief, SR/CId reported that, in response to the Commission's request, we have tested, in the Soviet Embassies in Stockholm and Helsinki, the time required to get a Soviet tourist visa, and find that 2-3 days is impossible and five days the apparent minimum in both places. In one, however, it was implied that shortage of hotel space might be a contributing factor, so these findings might not be valid for the month of October, when Oswald apparently got his visa in two or three days. We will submit a written report on this.

Chief, SR/CI

Attachments:
   As Stated
A memo from the Commission to CIA dated 25 May 1964, inquired after information relating to the relatively short period of time in which OSWALD acquired a tourist visa in Helsinki. The first attached item, a memo to the Commission dated 1 July 1964, provides such information as we could obtain on OSWALD's reconstructed timetable for travel from London to Helsinki. The second attached item, dated 31 July 1964, provides comments on length of time required to obtain a tourist visa in Helsinki and Stockholm.

For further information on these items, see:
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Mr. J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964

1. In response to a telephone inquiry made in July 1964 concerning the time required for issuance of a Soviet visa for a US businessman, the Soviet consul in Helsinki stated that he could issue a transit visa (valid for 24 hours) in five minutes but that for a longer stay he would need about a week to process a visa application and have Inhold arrange for lodgings. He implied that the main reason for delays in visa issuances was a shortage of hotel space in the USSR.

2. A Finnish travel agency representative told in July 1964 that he is able to obtain Soviet tourist visas for his customers within five days if he pushes the matter.

3. A telephone check with the Soviet consulate in Stockholm in July 1964 revealed that normal visa processing there takes seven days but that this can be shortened to five days "in exceptional cases." The Soviet official receiving the telephone call stated that it was impossible to get a visa within two or three days.

/4. A Soviet official
4. A Soviet official in Stockholm indicated in early 1964 that visa processing for foreigners wishing to visit the USSR normally takes six to eight days in Stockholm but that visas for Swedish businessmen and other personalities of special interest (not defined) can be processed directly by the Soviet embassy in Stockholm without referral to Moscow.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

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29 July 1964
Mr. PREYER. It has been a long afternoon and I imagine Mr. Helms would be ready for a recess period. I think we are very close to finishing. We have one other member who wishes to ask questions. I know you are anxious to finish. Would you prefer to take a 10-minute recess at this time or would you like to attempt to finish up?

Mr. HELMS. If you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go right along. I would like to finish if we possibly can as soon as we can.

Mr. PREYER. The Chair recognizes Mr Sawyer.

Mr. HELMS. Good afternoon, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Good afternoon, Ambassador.

First I would like to clear up what I think was a combination of misstatements about what Mr. Hart testified to vis-a-vis Nosenko. He did not say that we should not believe the veracity of what Nosenko said. He said he believed that but that he felt, because of the size and compartmentalization of the KGB, he would not at all necessarily know whether they had contact with him or not, and for that reason I am quite puzzled with this combination of not having accepted the bona fides of Nosenko and yet putting him on the payroll as a consultant.

How can you possibly get any value out of information supplied with someone when there is a belief or at least a strong possibility that he is a double agent, there for the specific purpose of deceiving?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, this is the constant and continuing hazard in all intelligence work of this kind. There isn't a statement that is made by any defector that comes to the United States that goes unchecked. We take all the statements and then they are checked out and there is an effort made to find out if they are true and they are examined and research work is done on them, and so forth, because this is a very difficult and untidy problem, I am sad to say. And it is particularly untidy given the importance of the Nosenko case.

I have been told he gave useful information to an agency of the U.S. Government about certain Soviet operations overseas and certain information about the KGB. I can't personally attest to this, and I am sorry; but I believe that certain of high information was believed to be of value.

Mr. SAWYER. It seems to me, looking at the facts of this thing here he was incarcerated under horrible conditions for a period of some 5 years or approximating 5 years, and then apparently the project was given up as not being able to resolve the question, at least to everyone's satisfaction. There are memorandums indicating it would be now a great catastrophe to release this man presumably after what had been done to him here in the country; it would be devastating if he talked much about it. There was even a memorandum of the director of the Soviet bloc group or division, discussing the possibilities of disposing of him and elaborating on that to mean either liquidation or drugging him to a point where he became incomprehensible so he couldn't tell anybody anything, or just putting him in an insane asylum and just throwing away the key apparently.
It would just seem to me after what you people did to Nosenko here in this country, without any color of law at all, that you really only had two choices: One was dispose of him as suggested—

Mr. HELMS. That was never considered, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I am talking about what your division chief of the Soviet bloc wrote down that was being considered at least by him.

Mr. HELMS. He was the Deputy Division Chief and maybe he did write these things down, but I say these things were never brought to my attention, the suggestion was never made to me, this was never an option that was considered.

Mr. SAWYER. You have testified about your considering assassinating people along with the Mafia. It is nothing new to you people apparently to assassinate somebody?

Mr. HELMS. That is your statement, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I thought that was what you have been testifying to here about willingly becoming a party to an assassination either by syringe, by gun, or by poison pills of Castro. So once we get in the acceptance of that line, it doesn’t seem to me so out of line that would be one of the things you would consider, and apparently your deputy division chief did consider it.

It seems to me the only other option would be to pay him off and handsomely enough so he would keep quiet about this when you let him go. You obviously couldn’t deport him very well at this point in time, and it just appears to me as I look at that it is perfectly plain that you exercised the option of paying him off.

Do you dispute that?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I dispute it.

Mr. SAWYER. You said you paid over a period of time some half a million dollars, is about what it amounts to as I quickly add it up, both in lump-sum payments and in monthly stipends to a guy that the Agency never decided wasn’t, in fact, there to mislead it and give it false information. You paid that as a consultant and you say the motivation was not at all to pay him off. Is that your position?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I am counting 10. That is what my mother taught me to do under these circumstances.

Mr. SAWYER. You are doing what?

Mr. HELMS. I am counting to 10.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I will be patient if it takes that long.

Mr. HELMS. The effort in Mr. Nosenko’s case and the only option that we had available to us in my opinion was to resettle him and give him a new identity and handle him in such a way he would have a chance to make a life for himself on the American scene.

It has been 5 years since I had anything to do with his case. I don’t know what has been done to him since.

Mr. SAWYER. You said you could not just put him out on welfare. What do we do with most immigrants that come in either from Indochina that are refugees or regularly admitted immigrants? We may provide them some educational help in the language, and that sort of thing, but we don’t pay them off. Here you are talking about sums of money that wouldn’t be mentionable in the same breath as welfare, and I just say as I look at this thing, taking all these facts you have testified into account, it would just seem to
me on the face of it that it was a payoff. I am surprised to hear you deny it.

Mr. HELMS. I believe that under the Constitution you are entitled to your viewpoint and I am entitled to mine.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, you did, in fact, plead guilty to having withheld information from the Senate committee, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. Sawyer. I thought you had.

Mr. HELMS. I did not. I pleaded nolo contendere.

Mr. Sawyer. So that you just don't contest it, then, which is the legal equivalent of a plea of guilty, is that correct; except that it can't be used as an admission against you in a civil case; right?

Mr. HELMS. I am not a lawyer, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. But I am sure you were advised by a lawyer before you entered a nolo contendere; were you not?

Mr. HELMS. I was advised by lawyers.

Mr. Sawyer. Something else bothers me. When you put Nosenko into solitary you obviously intended to hold him a very long time; did you not?

Mr. HELMS. I don't think that was the intention at the time. The intention was to hold him no longer than it took to find out whether he was bona fide or not or to satisfy ourselves on this.

Mr. Sawyer. But you invested in building a whole separate vault and building around it, and so forth, for the purpose of accommodating Nosenko; did you not?

Mr. HELMS. I asked this morning if anybody from the committee had looked at the building. It was no vault, as I recollect it. I don't think it was a very expensive building at all.

Mr. Sawyer. Where was it located?

Mr. HELMS. It was located in Virginia.

Mr. Sawyer. Was it on a military base?

Mr. HELMS. I believe those items are classified, and I was told by the agency to go into executive session if you wanted to discuss this.

Mr. Sawyer. Do they still use this?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know.

Mr. Sawyer. Was it ever used for anyone else other than Nosenko?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know. I don't think so.

Mr. Sawyer. Apparently it was a reinforced steel box that was described by Mr. Hart as being like a bank vault, and he then described that a house had been built around it to accommodate the interrogating staff and guards, and what not, and then surrounded by a linked barbed-wire fence.

You wouldn't do that just to put somebody in it for a couple of months, would you?

Mr. HELMS. It would have depended on the circumstances. And after all, this was a very important case to us, so I would think the question of the amount of money that the installation cost really rarely came up.

Mr. Sawyer. What was the purpose of moving him from what was apparently a secure place of confinement into this so-called safe house? What was the purpose of building another facility and moving him out of there into that?
Mr. HELMS. I assume because those safe houses are much more complicated to administer, it take more guards, and things of that kind. I think there were practical considerations involved.

Mr. SAWYER. Wouldn't it be a fair deduction if you went to the trouble of building a separate facility of this type that it obviously was going to be quite a long-term incarceration if that is specifically for what it was built?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I just said, sir, this was not the intention. The intention was to try to find out whether this man was bona fide and that was the objective, and when we had done that we would have let him loose and if this was a mistake in building this house, then I guess it was a mistake.

Mr. SAWYER. You said, too, that you didn't subject Nosenko to physical abuse. As I have both talked to Nosenko and listened to the CIA official spokesmen define it, it was a partial starvation, being subjected to cold weather without being provided a blanket, not being allowed fresh air during the heat of the summer for over a year. Don't you consider that, just those items alone, as being physical torture actually?

Mr. HELMS. I cannot verify those items. I don't know whether they are true or not. You have told me today they are true.

Mr. SAWYER. You were the man in charge when he had been without any legal process or trial, just incarcerated in solitary confinement. You were in charge of the Agency that was doing that, weren't you?

Mr. HELMS. I wasn't in charge at that time.

Mr. SAWYER. During part of that time you were.

Mr. HELMS. I became in charge later. Is there any evidence when I was Director these things happened to him? I didn't know anything about it at the time. I hear conflicting stories about how he was treated. You'll have to use your stories, I'll use mine.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. McCone could have found out anything in the Agency that he wanted to find out. You said that right here, you remember?

Mr. HELMS. I said that.

Mr. SAWYER. So I presume as one of the people in charge of this having occurred to the man, you could have found out anything about what was happening to him that you wanted to, couldn't you?

Mr. HELMS. I never was told any tales——

Mr. SAWYER. Well, you knew he was in your custody?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Mr. SAWYER. And you never made any inquiry about what was happening to him over this 4- or 5-year period?

Mr. HELMS. Of course I did.

Mr. SAWYER. Did you find out then what they were doing to him, what you were doing to him?

Mr. HELMS. I was never told of these details of his being kept in a room so hot he couldn't stand it, or any of those things. Those were never brought to my attention and I never got those in answer to any inquiry. If this is the truth I am genuinely sorry about it, but I was not aware of it at the time.

Mr. SAWYER. You said about Oswald when he came back from Russia that you wouldn't have had really any particular jurisdic-
tion or interest because he was a marine. As I understand it, he had been discharged from the Marine Corps, and for how long a period of time does military service retain intelligence jurisdiction over a person?

Mr. Helms. I don't know. I really don't.

Mr. Sawyer. When you were interviewed apparently by a Mr. Lardner, George Lardner of the Washington Post after your executive testimony here, you said in effect to him—the article is in the Washington Post of Thursday, August 10, referring to your appearance here on August 9: "Your questions are almost as dumb as the committee's."

Does that fairly reflect your personal opinion and attitude?

Mr. Helms. I don't recall talking to Mr. Lardner after the hearing the other time. I was chatting in the hall with a newspaperman around lunchtime. I don't recall such an acerbic remark as that, and of course I withdraw it if I did make it. I never even saw the article, so it must have been the first edition of the Washington Post. The article I saw the next day didn't have anything like that in it. It teaches you never to talk to the press. I mean that's the only lesson, if they quoted me accurately. If they didn't quote me accurately, then I shouldn't have made off-the-cuff remarks.

But I don't feel that way. I think this inquisition has been admirably handled.

Mr. Sawyer. If you didn't read the article, let me give you the benefit of the applicable part of it. It says:

Helms told reporters during a break that no one would ever know who or what Lee Harvey Oswald, named by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's assassin, represented. Asked whether the CIA knew of any ties Oswald had with either the KGB or the CIA, Helms paused and with a laugh said, 'I don't remember.' Pressed on the point, he told a reporter, 'Your questions are almost as dumb as the committee's.'

You don't recall any such statement?

Mr. Helms. I recall an exchange about Oswald because I don't think we are ever going to find out what Lee Harvey Oswald's role was until we get the Russians' KGB files. That is what I was referring to.

Mr. Sawyer. You did allude to the representation in Mr. McCone's letter or affidavit that there was no formal connection between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA. Did the use of the word formal intend to exclude any other type of relationship or contact?

Mr. Helms. No, Mr. Sawyer. I am sorry. I was trying to use a short cut, I think. But in the documents I was given in preparation before this hearing the actual affidavit of Mr. McCone is there present and I think should be permitted to stand on its own feet. In other words, I would not want to say I was attempting to add or subtract from it.

Mr. Sawyer. But there was no specific connotation?

Mr. Helms. No, sir. I am sorry if in my effort to make a short sentence I didn't go all through the various points that were made in there, because as I said earlier this afternoon, I never found the slightest evidence that the Agency had anything to do with Lee Harvey Oswald, and I was just hoping that maybe this hearing would put that rumor to rest.
Mr. Sawyer. In your long time with the Agency, have you ever known of any example where anything remotely similar to what was done to Nosenko was done to someone else here in this country?

Mr. Helms. No; I know of no other case comparable, nor do I know of any case that confronted us where a man might have information having to do with the assassination of the President of the United States.

The answer to your questions specifically is I know of no comparable case and I believe there never was one.

Mr. Sawyer. Whereas I recognize your disclaimer of being a lawyer, you certainly know that the police, even with the assassin himself, could never have done anything like this; would never have been permitted to do anything like this. You understand people's rights enough for that, don't you?

Mr. Helms. Oh, yes, I understand people's rights.

Mr. Sawyer. Holding a man in solitary confinement under these kinds of conditions without a trial and subjecting him to both physical and mental torture—even with an assassin himself.

There is no way the laws of our country permit that kind of thing. You knew that, didn't you?

Mr. Helms. Well, I rather thought that the legal status of Mr. Nosenko in those days was in a very gray area and if I am wrong about it I wish you would correct me now, Mr. Sawyer, because I am prepared to be corrected.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, he was a human being, wasn't he?

Mr. Helms. I believe so.

Mr. Sawyer. You know in most States even treating an animal like this will land you in jail.

I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wyly. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms, you made a point earlier in your testimony today with regard to the testimony of Mr. Hart before this committee. You commented on the fact that he didn't really share with us any specific knowledge about the substance of our inquiry; that is, in connection with whatever connection there may have been between the KGB and Lee Harvey Oswald, and to that extent what information the Agency had with regard to that specific information.

I have to agree. In fact, Mr. Hart mentioned here that he had stated specifically to the Agency that if he were to be expected to talk about Lee Harvey Oswald, then it was pointless of the Agency to send him up here because he had no intention of talking about Lee Harvey Oswald.

If this committee were to ask you who would be a good witness or several good witnesses that we could talk to either presently employed at the Agency or former employees of the Agency who could shed additional light on that particular aspect of our investigation, who would you suggest?

Mr. Helms. I would suggest the Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division and the Deputy Chief who have been maligned here. I think they might come before this committee and answer for themselves as to
the reasons behind the way the interrogation was conducted. I think that would be good for openers.

Mr. Dodd. Who are these people again? I am sorry.

Mr. Helms. The gentlemen who were Chief and Deputy Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division at the time of the Nosenko interrogation.

Mr. Dodd. Could I go back a minute. Counsel asked you some questions about this 201 file that existed on Lee Henry Oswald, I believe.

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Dodd. There is some confusion I think in the committee’s mind as to how that file was opened. What kind of file is it? What is a 201 file?

Mr. Helms. It is nothing but a personality file. We might open a file—we get pieces of paper like this and if they refer to Christopher Dodd, we would open a file on Christopher Dodd. They just happen to be called a 201 file because we had a numbering category files of different kinds used in different parts of the Agency. There is no arcane significance at all; it is just a number. It might have been called 5-type files or X-type files.

Mr. Dodd. You said it takes something to trigger it?

Mr. Helms. Yes, it takes a form like this to be filled out.

Mr. Dodd. I wanted to get clear in my own mind. Can you tell the committee what it was specifically that triggered the opening of the 201 file on Lee Henry Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I don’t know what happened, sir, I don’t know how they got the name wrong. I have no idea any more, if I ever knew. I don’t know whether it was a clerical error, a mistake, or just what. I recognize in 1978 when you look back 15 years, Lee Harvey Oswald was not a household name. It may have been somebody thought it was Henry and read it wrong and it was Harvey. But I think it got straightened out very quickly, at the time of the dissemination of reports to the Government when he visited the Soviet and Cuban consulates in Mexico City.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, may I request that we suspend for a couple of minutes.

I think I can get down to the bottom line very quickly. The mere existence of a 201 file does not suggest in any way, does it, that the person who is the subject of a 201 file is in any manner, shape or form an employee, agent, operative of the Agency?

Mr. Helms. No, sir; it does not. It simply is a device for holding information. When an individual gets into special categories of relationships with the Agency, then the whole file business is changed.

Mr. Dodd. So the existence of a 201 file on Lee Henry—or Lee Harvey Oswald in the Agency would in no way indicate that he is in fact a paid employee of the Agency?

Mr. Helms. It means absolutely nothing. As a matter of fact, there were files in the Agency on Congressmen and Senators, but they had newspaper clippings. If you are going to file a newspaper clipping, you have to put it someplace.

Mr. Dodd. Fine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Helms. Thank you for making that point of clarification, Mr. Dodd.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you. I have no questions.
I think the ground has been very thoroughly covered.
I do just want to take my few minutes to make a brief statement about the hearings that we have had today and yesterday. I think the past 2 days of testimony have shown the CIA did things 15 years ago or so which shock us, sometimes shock us profoundly today.
I had someone at the luncheon recess conclude from this testimony that America is a lawless society because one of our institutions broke the law some years ago. Well, this is certainly not a lawless society. Russia is a lawless society, where a handfull of people control things and where you cannot change it unless a revolution or a war comes along.
I think the past few days' hearings here have indicated that we can change things. The kind of testimony Mr. Hart of the CIA gave, criticizing his own institution, your testimony today, it is impossible to conceive of a KGB agent, for example, ever admitting that anything they did 15 years ago was wrong.
I don't think it was wrong to bring out these horrors of the past. I think the old adage that "the truth can make you free" is true here. The truth about these things, I think, will free up the CIA from past mistakes and it will free up all of us. And that is the second point I want to make.
I think when we view these actions of some time ago today, we have to realize that at that time when these acts were committed there was a national consensus that this Nation's security was in peril. So I think we would want to be very careful how we make retroactive scapegoats.
There are those who betrayed one trust, their trust of office, the trust of power; but they did so to preserve another trust, the trust of national security.
In all of these hearings, Mr. Helms, in all of the inquiry situations that you have been subjected to lately, I don't think anyone has ever suggested that you ever betrayed that other trust, of the national security. I think in judging the actions of individuals in the past, we want to consider who it was who called up those actions. In large measures, the American people at that time were calling up these measures out of fear that our national security was in peril.
Mr. Helms, we appreciate your being here with us today and answering all of these questions.
At the conclusion of the testimony of our witnesses, we allow each witness 5 minutes to make any statements that he may choose to make. You have testified at some length today, but if there is any matter you wish to clear up, any statement you wish to make, we will be glad to hear from you at this time.
Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, I would like to say I deeply appreciate the remarks you have just made at the conclusion of this hearing. I thank you for them. I thank you for your courtesy as chairman. I have no other comments.
Mr. PREYER. If there is no further business today, the committee stands recessed until 9 o'clock Monday morning.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the committee to reconvene on Monday, September 25, 1978, at 9 a.m.]