

- 3 -

Finally, I should emphasize that all Office of Security personnel in this country and abroad are instructed to participate in the personal protection of the President only when requested to do so by the Secret Service. They are also instructed to transmit any information which concerns the safety of the President immediately to the Secret Service.

In response to the last paragraph of your letter, we do not have any specific recommendations to make regarding possible improvements in any aspect of Presidential protection. Department officials would be pleased to discuss this matter with you or your representatives, however, if you believe this would be helpful.

Please let me know if we may be of further help in this matter.

Sincerely yours,



Abram Chayes

Enclosures:

As stated plus Marine Security  
Guard Handbook (see Chapter VI)

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 1354—Continued



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
WASHINGTON 25,


April 24, 1964

Honorable J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel, President's Commission  
on the Assassination of President Kennedy  
200 Maryland Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D.C., 20002

Dear Mr. Rankin:

In response to your letter of March 24, 1964, attached are reports from the three military departments and the Defense Intelligence Agency concerning arrangements for safeguarding the President.

Sincerely yours,



Frank A. Bartimo  
Assistant General Counsel  
(Manpower)

Attachments

1. DIA report 10 Apr 64
2. Army report 17 Apr 64
3. Navy report 17 Apr 64
4. AF Report 16 Apr 64

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 1355



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 APR 1964

C-939/CI-1

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Safeguarding the President

1. Reference your attached memorandum, dated 31 March 1964, and the enclosed request from the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, dated 24 March 1964.
2. Defense Intelligence Agency activities are, in the main, oriented on intelligence information relative to foreign governments. Domestic intelligence is not within DIA's normal milieu. From time to time domestic information of security interest may become available. Such information is passed laterally to one of the military services if it affects service security or to the Federal Bureau of Investigation if of non-service import.
3. Defense Intelligence Agency maintains active community relationships with other intelligence services or agencies, both through official boards or committees and through formal or informal liaison. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is a participant agency in these activities. The Secret Service is not a member of the intelligence community as such. Since the Secret Service is not within the so-called intelligence community, Defense Intelligence Agency has no formal or recurring informal ties with that service.
4. In view of these considerations, Defense Intelligence Agency had no written description of criteria employed in determining what information coming to the attention of Defense Intelligence Agency should be furnished to the Secret Service.
5. No written description existed at the time of the assassination for procedures to be employed in carrying out liaison with the Secret Service in connection with safeguarding the President.
6. No memorandum on matters set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 above have been prepared since the assassination.
7. The involvement of the United States government in many military and quasi-military activities overseas, coupled with the uncertainties deriving from racial and social changes within the United States, suggest that assassination attempts and violence directed at key figures in all echelons of the United States government may have an upward swing. It is suggested that a central clearance house be publicly established at the Department of Justice, which would be known to the civil population as well as Federal, State and community agencies as a point to which information related to possible violence could be directed. This office would,

admittedly, receive a large input of trash mail. At its worst this would permit identification of such material. At its best such an office might very well develop information that would defeat the plans of an assassin. Such an office would insure liaison between agencies, maintain appropriate records, accomplish investigations through existing agencies and facilities and minimize the possibility that information on a planned assassination could be overlooked.

8. This DIA memorandum is also in answer to your request to JCS.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

W. C. KIKER  
Captain, USM  
Acting Chief, Office of  
Counterintelligence and Security

2 Atchs  
s/e

APR 17 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy

Reference is made to memorandum, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, 31 March 1964, with inclosure, concerning a request for information from the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Incl 1).

Department of the Army policy and guidance for liaison with other agencies, including the United States Secret Service, are prescribed in the following regulations or manuals, copies or extracts of which are attached (Incl 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6):

a. For Military Police Activities. Paragraph 9, AR 195-10; paragraph 3, AR 22-160; Section VII, FM 19-10, Military Police Operations.

b. For Intelligence Corps Activities. AR 381-113; FM 30-17.

No study has been conducted, since the assassination of President Kennedy, of the procedures in conducting liaison with the United States Secret Service or any Federal or civil law enforcement agencies as they concern the safeguarding of the President. Existing procedures in the Department of the Army as they pertain to coordination appear to be adequate for the purpose intended.

Recommendations from the Department of the Army regarding improvement in the matter of safeguarding the President are considered to be inappropriate, inasmuch as the official and legal responsibility for this vital function rests with the United States Secret Service. The United States Army is prepared to furnish any support or assistance in connection with the establishment of any additional procedures to safeguard the Commander in Chief, as required or directed.

(Signed) R. Tenney Johnson

6 Incl  
As stated

R. Tenney Johnson  
Acting General Counsel

COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 1355—Continued

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17 APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy

In response to your request of 31 March 1964 regarding information desired by the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, the following is submitted.

The Office of Naval Intelligence has for many years maintained a close and continuing relationship with the U. S. Secret Service. Information forwarded to this office by the field components of ONI, regardless of its minuteness, that pertains to the laws enforced by the Secret Service is made available to that Service by the most expeditious means available.

This office has received many so called "crank" letters, both signed and anonymous, vilifying harm or disrespect to the President. Letters of this type, if written by naval personnel, are investigated and the results made available to the Secret Service. If they are of the anonymous type or written by persons not under the investigative jurisdiction of this office, they are referred to the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service for their action.

This office further cooperates with the Secret Service, at their request, in connection with the physical protection of the President in locales outside of the Metropolitan Washington area. For many years the Philadelphia District Office has assisted during the President's visit for the annual Army Navy football game; the Charleston, South Carolina District Office assisted during the visit of the late President to Cape Canaveral on 15-16 November 1963 and the same office again assisted during the visit of President Johnson to the Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida on 26-27 February 1964. Previously, Naval Intelligence assisted when former President Truman was in residence at Key West, Florida, and former President Eisenhower vacationed at Newport, Rhode Island.

COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 1355—Continued

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

16 APR 1964

In the law enforcement field generally, the relationship between the Secret Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence has always been mutually harmonious. This office conducts many inquiries abroad for the Service in areas in which a Treasury Department representative is not located. Joint investigations are frequently conducted regarding forgery of government checks by Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and this office has conducted counterfeit investigations abroad involving military personnel. Liaison with the Secret Service at the national level is rarely, if ever, by mail. Reports, memoranda, currency, etc. are delivered by hand by a Special Agent qualified to discuss problems of a mutual interest.

Other than continuing the close relationship described above, this office has no specific recommendations regarding Presidential protection.

W. B. FAY, Jr.  
Secretary of the Navy

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT:** Request for Information from President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy

Reference is made to your memorandum dated March 31, 1964 concerning a request for information from the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.

The following actions were being taken in the Air Force for the protection of the President prior to the assassination of President Kennedy:

a. Copies of airmail letters containing vindictive information or threats to the life of the President of the United States received at Headquarters, United States Air Force, were furnished the United States Secret Service (USSS).

b. The Air Force, upon request of the USSS, assisted that agency in providing protection coverage for the President. As part of its distinguished visitor protection program, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) is the Air Force agency primarily responsible for providing this assistance. Frequently, however, Air Police are utilized locally at the request of the USSS. A copy of the OSI directive concerning distinguished visitor protection is attached. (Atch 1, dated April 15, 1963.)

c. Additionally, the Air Force provided physical security for the United States Air Force Presidential aircraft. Attached is Air Force Regulation 905-56 which describes the manner in which this type of security is afforded. (Atch 2). Air Force Regulation 905-56 is further supplemented by a USAF brochure prepared by the Commander, 125th Air Transport Wing (USAF), Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. (Atch 3).

d. Personnel security investigations of those personnel who have regular or frequent access to the Presidential aircraft were conducted by OSI. SOP HME is the name assigned to this program and the OSI directive governing its conduct is attached. (Atch 4).

Subsequent to the assassination of President Kennedy, the OSI took the following actions:

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 1355—Continued

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

6 May 1964

a. The OMI issued instructions to its field offices world-wide to assure compliance with the directives which are referred to above as Attachments 1 and 4. Specifically, OMI commanders were reminded that only mature and experienced agents are to be utilized on such operations, and that they are to be proficient in the use of small firearms.

b. In addition, the above instructions requested OMI commanders to revitalize standing operating procedures which must include dossiers containing photographs and available information on Communist Groups and/or personalities, agitators, crackpots, etc., known to be on base or immediately contiguous to Air Force installations who are apt to cause trouble during operations of this nature. This material is furnished the USSS at such time as the President is scheduled into the area. In addition to liaison with the USSS, close liaison relations are maintained with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law enforcement agencies with regard to the performance of protective measures.

c. Because of the proximity of the LBF Base to Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, it was anticipated that the President would be a frequent visitor to that base. In this connection, the OMI directed its Texas field office to prepare a comprehensive and detailed operations plan to be used in assisting the USSS as much as possible in planning for the protection of the President on his anticipated visits to the LBF Base. Additionally, a cadre of OMI personnel in Texas is being given refresher training in specialized defensive measures, crowd control procedures and firearms training for the purpose of having OMI personnel engaged in these duties operationally ready to support the USSS upon request.

d. Representatives of OMI have discussed with the USSS means by which the Air Force could improve its capabilities for assisting that agency in protecting the President. At the request of OMI, USSS has agreed to have selected senior staff officers from OMI attend their training course in the near future. This training will enable these officers to better assist and guide OMI field personnel.

JOSEPH P. HOCHREITER  
Deputy Administrative Assistant

## 1. Attachments

1. Extract from OMI Manual 124-4
2. AFR 205-45
3. USAF Procedure Prepared by Comdr, 124th Air Transport Wing (HAWP)
4. OMI Regulation 124-1-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Policy and Criteria for Dissemination  
of Information to the Secret Service;  
Recommendations of the Central  
Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential  
Protection

1. I refer to your memorandum of 16 March 1964, requesting any information on CIA policy and criteria relative to the dissemination of information in the matter of Presidential protection.

2. The formal regulations and established policies of this Agency provide for maintenance of liaison with other U.S. Government agencies on security, counterintelligence and other matters falling within their specific responsibilities. CIA liaison channels exist with the Secret Service. Intelligence on threats to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential households, whether of foreign or domestic origin, as well as data on the counterfeiting of United States currency, is promptly passed to the Secret Service when received.

3. Since 1955, the CIA has been cooperating very closely with the Secret Service when U.S. Presidents travel to foreign countries. In June 1963, the CIA thoroughly reviewed and formalized its procedures with respect to furnishing intelligence support to the President on his trips abroad and providing briefings

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 1356