

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

6 May 1964

a. The OMI issued instructions to its field offices world-wide to assure compliance with the directives which are referred to above as Attachments 1 and 4. Specifically, OMI commanders were reminded that only mature and experienced agents are to be utilized on such operations, and that they are to be proficient in the use of small firearms.

b. In addition, the above instructions requested OMI commanders to revitalize standing operating procedures which must include dossiers containing photographs and available information on Communist Groups and/or personalities, agitators, crackpots, etc., known to be on base or immediately contiguous to Air Force installations who are apt to cause trouble during operations of this nature. This material is furnished the USSS at such time as the President is scheduled into the area. In addition to liaison with the USSS, close liaison relations are maintained with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law enforcement agencies with regard to the performance of protective measures.

c. Because of the proximity of the LRF Base to Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas, it was anticipated that the President would be a frequent visitor to that base. In this connection, the OMI directed its Texas field office to prepare a comprehensive and detailed operations plan to be used in assisting the USSS as much as possible in planning for the protection of the President on his anticipated visits to the LRF Base. Additionally, a cadre of OMI personnel in Texas is being given refresher training in specialized defensive measures, crowd control procedures and firearms training for the purpose of having OMI personnel engaged in these duties operationally ready to support the USSS upon request.

d. Representatives of OMI have discussed with the USSS means by which the Air Force could improve its capabilities for assisting that agency in protecting the President. At the request of OMI, USSS has agreed to have selected senior staff officers from OMI attend their training course in the near future. This training will enable these officers to better assist and guide OMI field personnel.

JOSEPH P. HOCHREITER  
Deputy Administrative Assistant

## 1. Attachments

1. Extract from OMI Manual 124-4
2. AFR 205-45
3. USAF Procedure Prepared by Comdr, 124th Air Transport Wing (HAWP)
4. OMI Regulation 124-1-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Policy and Criteria for Dissemination  
of Information to the Secret Service;  
Recommendations of the Central  
Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential  
Protection

1. I refer to your memorandum of 16 March 1964, requesting any information on CIA policy and criteria relative to the dissemination of information in the matter of Presidential protection.

2. The formal regulations and established policies of this Agency provide for maintenance of liaison with other U.S. Government agencies on security, counterintelligence and other matters falling within their specific responsibilities. CIA liaison channels exist with the Secret Service. Intelligence on threats to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential households, whether of foreign or domestic origin, as well as data on the counterfeiting of United States currency, is promptly passed to the Secret Service when received.

3. Since 1955, the CIA has been cooperating very closely with the Secret Service when U.S. Presidents travel to foreign countries. In June 1963, the CIA thoroughly reviewed and formalized its procedures with respect to furnishing intelligence support to the President on his trips abroad and providing briefings

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and other assistance to the Secret Service. Provision was made at that time for the elaboration of intelligence requirements and daily dissemination of all intelligence bearing on Presidential trips, including the President's physical security, to the Secret Service and other agencies concerned.

4. Because of its strict concern with overseas activity, CIA is most likely to obtain information on threats to the President's safety while travelling abroad, or data on plots against his physical well-being that are planned abroad for execution outside the United States. On occasion, however, CIA sources have provided intelligence on plans, originating abroad, that allegedly were to be carried out in the United States. Such reports have been immediately disseminated to the Secret Service.

5. With regard to your request for recommendations on the matter of Presidential protection in the future, we submit comments only on those areas that relate directly to this Agency's jurisdiction. A check with the CIA component responsible for dissemination of CIA intelligence information to other agencies reveals that the Secret Service has filed no formal requirements for intelligence information. Formal requirements held on file for its parent organization, the Treasury Department, include requests for information on United States currency and the counterfeiting thereof, and the smuggling of any items readily convertible into cash. These Treasury requirements do not include a request for information dealing with the personal security of the President. As noted above, however, the CIA has been furnishing the Secret Service with this type of information as it comes to our attention.

6. CIA does not have detailed knowledge of Secret Service procedures for the processing of incoming intelligence. This Agency has come to appreciate, however, that prompt processing, review and distribution of information received, is a function that can be efficiently performed only by a unit charged with that responsibility within the action component.

7. Finally, as you know, the Commission has been briefed on the application of CIA's experience in electronic data processing to the type of problem the Secret Service may face in planning the

protection of the President in the future. On 24 December 1963, CIA initiated correspondence with the Secret Service on electronic data processing, and offered to provide data on the machine records program that has been developed for this Agency. We are presently in communication with the Secret Service on this matter.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans